A12: Future of the Eastern Partnership: a new European strategy for the East

11 November 2023 (lapsing). Renewed for Federal Committee April 2026 Submitted
by Political Commission 3: External Affairs & Global Governance

The Eastern Partnership (EaP), within the framework of the European
Neighbourhood Policy, is a policy of strategic interest to the European Union
(EU) and should therefore be reformed so that it may enable an even greater
level of cooperation. EaP countries and their citizens have a wish for closer
European integration. However, the region can no longer be treated as a single

bloc: it now consists of EU accession candidates (Ukraine, Moldova), a country
whose European path is blocked by its own government, despite its candidate
status (Georgia), a state pivoting towards the EU while maintaining complex
economic ties with Russia (Armenia), an authoritarian energy partner
(Azerbaijan), and a country under effective Russian occupation (Belarus). Russia
still harbours imperialist ambitions on former Soviet republics, instead of
respecting their independence and freedom to choose their own future. Russia’s
continued imperialist agenda prevents peaceful cooperation between the Russian
Federation and the European Union while also sowing discontent and instability
in the EaP countries.

The European Union should demonstrate that it is the main partner for dialogue
and cooperation with EaP countries, as well as the best equipped global actor to
guarantee peace, stability, progress and respect for democracy and human rights.
The EU must respond with a differentiated strategy that offers credible
accession perspectives to willing reformers, deepens security cooperation with
vulnerable partners, and supports civil society under authoritarian rule. JEF
Europe therefore calls for a radical shift in the EU's foreign policy towards
the Eastern Partnership based on differentiation, conditionality, and genuine
solidarity.

JEF Europe,

1. Recalling JEF Europe’s resolutions, a) “For a common European response to the
invasion of Ukraine and the future of Ukraine”; b) “The EU response to the
Russian Federation’s aggression of Ukraine”, strongly condemning Russia’s full-
scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year, and urging for stronger EU
support to Ukraine, including military, financial, and humanitarian assistance;

2. Noting with frustration the limits of the EU's foreign policy and the related
unanimity rule in the framework of the ENP, which remains too often constrained
and paralysed by the conflicting positions of the Member States in the Council,
allowing a single country to block sanctions, enlargement steps, or crisis
responses;

3. Deeply concerned about the human toll of active and unresolved conflicts
across the region, including Russia's war against Ukraine, the continued
occupation of Georgian

territories, Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian
population, and the frozen conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic
of Moldova;

4. Denouncing Russia's comprehensive destabilisation campaign aimed at
undermining EaP countries through military aggression, hybrid attacks, election
interference, disinformation, energy blackmail, trade embargoes, and the
conclusion of integration treaties with separatist or breakaway regions, such as
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia,
and Kherson;

5. Noting with regret the insufficient reaction of the EU to Russia's violation
of Georgian territorial integrity in 2008 and the consequent emboldening of
Russia, and insisting that the EU must learn from this failure by adopting a
credible deterrence and sanctions policy today;

6. Noting with concern, the growing influence and destabilising actions of
external actors in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions, including Türkiye’s
assertive posture, Iran's deepening ties, and China's expanding economic
footprint;

7. Having regarded the implementation of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and
Enhanced Partnership Agreement since 2019, and welcoming Armenia's historic
pivot towards the European Union, demonstrated by: the effective suspension of
its CSTO membership; active participation in the EU civilian mission; the launch
of visa liberalisation dialogues; and the adoption of a law on initiating EU
accession in early 2025, while noting that Armenia intends to maintain its
economic ties with the Eurasian Economic Union;

8. Condemning the ethnic cleansing of the entire Armenian population of Nagorno
Karabakh by Azerbaijan following Azerbaijan's September 2023 military offensive,
and deeply concerned by the lack of provisions for the right of return in the
peace agreement concluded in 2025 and ongoing threats to Armenian cultural and
religious heritage;

9. Deeply concerned that following decoupling from Russia, the EU has become
increasingly dependent on other non-democratic regimes like Azerbaijan for
energy, without imposing meaningful human rights conditionality, thereby
undermining the EU's credibility as a normative power;

10. Deeply concerned about Belarus's complete subordination to Russia since the
fraudulent 2020 elections, including: the permanent stationing of Russian
tactical nuclear weapons; the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries; the
integration of Belarusian territory into Russia's military planning; the
regime's complicity in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children; and the
weaponisation of migration as a hybrid warfare tool, and strongly condemning the
continued brutal response of the authorities against the opposition, now largely
in exile, in prison, or silenced;

11. Applauding the progress made by Ukraine and Moldova towards EU membership,
welcoming the opening of accession negotiations with both countries and the
completion of bilateral screening, and noting that the European Commission
assessed in late 2025 that both countries are ready to open thematic clusters
including the fundamental cluster on justice and human rights;

12. Condemning the actions of the illegitimate Georgian government led by
Georgian Dream including the deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions,
including: the adoption of the Russian-style "foreign agents" law; brutal
crackdowns on peaceful protesters; anti-LGBTQI+ legislation; and the reversal of
democratic reforms, while expressing continued solidarity with the Georgian
people's unwavering European aspirations and resistance against the illegitimate
regime;

13. Also deeply concerned about the significant challenges faced by the EaP
countries in ensuring an adequate level of human rights standards, as well as
the state of democracy and the rule of law;

14. Reiterating the importance of freedom of the media, freedom of expression
and the activities of non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders,
especially represented in youth organisations, in shaping public opinion based
on factual information free from foreign interference, hybrid threats and
disinformation;

15. Recalling the essential contribution of civil society organisations, such as
the members of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, regarding the
quality of democracy and their important involvement in the dialogue between the
European institutions and the EaP countries;

16. Acknowledging that the 'Beyond 2020' framework on the Eastern Partnership
has become obsolete given the fundamentally different relationships the EU now
maintains with accession candidates, authoritarian regimes, and countries under
Russian occupation;

17. Reminding that the campaign “Democracy under Pressure”, which aims to raise
awareness of democratic backsliding, human rights abuses, and challenges to the
rule of law, initially in Belarus, is one of JEF’s oldest campaigns, and has
expanded in relevance to encompass democratic collapse in Georgia, authoritarian
consolidation in Azerbaijan, and the ongoing struggle for democracy across the
region;

18. Noting the launch of the EU's Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea and
the strategic approach to the Black Sea region adopted in 2025, which
establishes three pillars: enhancing security and resilience, fostering
sustainable growth, and promoting environmental protection;

19. Recognising the importance of climate diplomacy and green transition
cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine,
Moldova, and Georgia, as part of the EU's strategic interest in building
resilient and sustainable societies;

JEF Europe therefore,

1. Reiterates the EU's commitment to strengthening multilateralism and recalls
the importance of developing a common European foreign policy as the only way to
pursue peace and international justice;

2. Demands the introduction of qualified majority voting in particular in
foreign policy decisions concerning the Eastern neighbourhood, ending the
paralysis caused by individual Member States, who entertain close diplomatic and
economic ties with the Russian Federation, blocking sanctions, enlargement
steps, or crisis responses;

3. Insists that the most important area on which the EU's Eastern policy should
be focused is the advancement of respect for human rights, the rule of law, and
the achievement of a higher standard of democracy, while recognising that the
needs differ fundamentally between accession countries, where conditionality
applies, countries suffering from armed aggression and authoritarian regimes,
where support must flow exclusively to civil society and independent media;

4. Encourages the EU institutions to further intensify their cooperation with
the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe in monitoring and implementing strategies and practices aimed at
improving the level of democracy, the rule of law, and achieving the expression
of political and civil rights for all citizens;

5. Mandates the EU to maintain and significantly expand sanctions on Belarus
indefinitely, targeting sectors enabling Russian military integration, the
forced deportation of Ukrainian children, and the regime's hybrid warfare
operations, including migration manipulation, and to maintain these sanctions
until free and fair elections are held and all political prisoners are released;

6. Requires the EU to significantly increase and simplify funding for local
independent civil society, human rights defenders, independent universities,
research centres, independent media, and democratic movements across the Eastern
neighbourhood, with particular attention to organisations operating under
authoritarian regimes where access is restricted and risks are high;

7. Demands that the EU massively scale up support for independent media, fact-
checking organisations, and media literacy programmes as a direct counter to
Russian disinformation campaigns and state propaganda;

8. Insists that the EU actively support EaP countries in safeguarding their
rights under international law, including territorial integrity, and champion
accountability

mechanisms for crimes of aggression, war crimes, and human rights violations
committed in the region, through support for international tribunals and
prosecution mechanisms;

9. Demands that the EU take a leading role in conflict resolution and peace-
building across the region, including through expanded civilian monitoring
missions such as EUMA in Armenia, active participation in existing negotiation
formats, and targeted sanctions against spoilers;

10. Insists that any peace agreements addressing regional conflicts include
explicit provisions for the right of return of displaced populations and
protection of cultural and religious heritage;

11. Demands that energy cooperation with Azerbaijan be conditioned on meaningful
human rights compliance, with suspension mechanisms for continued violations,
including review of the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,
imposing targeted sanctions on those responsible for arbitrary detention, and
freezing expanded energy cooperation until tangible human rights progress is
made;

12. Calls on the EU to articulate a clear and differentiated long-term strategy
for the Eastern neighbourhood, offering credible EU membership to willing and
reform-minded countries, deepening security and defence cooperation to counter
Russian aggression, supporting the resilience of societies under authoritarian
rule, and keeping the door open to all Eastern partners that demonstrate genuine
commitment to European values and reforms;

13. Demands that the EU pursue a merit-based but politically ambitious
enlargement agenda that:

● maintains momentum in accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova,
supporting the opening of the fundamental cluster on justice and human rights; ●
offers a credible European perspective to Georgia, conditional on a fundamental
reversal of anti-democratic legislation;

● explores deepened political association with Armenia should it continue its
European orientation, while acknowledging its complex economic ties; ● keeps the
door open to other Eastern partners that demonstrate genuine commitment to
European values;

14. Insists on the full implementation of Association Agreements and Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and reform-minded countries, and
calls for their gradual extension to cover sectoral integration in energy,
digital markets, transport, and green transition, as a pathway to closer
economic alignment with the EU single market;

15. Supports deeper sectoral integration between the EU and willing Eastern
partners, including:

● transport connectivity through extension of TEN-T networks;

● digital integration through roaming agreements and harmonisation of digital
markets;

● energy cooperation through synchronisation of grids and renewable energy
partnerships;

● green transition through access to EU climate financing;

16. Insists on the role that the EU, in cooperation with civil society
organisations, must play in promoting civil and political rights, in ensuring
the protection of ethnic and religious minorities including Armenians remaining
in Azerbaijan and national minorities in Georgia, and in defending the civil
rights of the most discriminated and harassed members of society, including
those in the LGBTQI+ community who face increasing state-sponsored persecution
in several EaP countries;

17. Requires a major expansion of EU youth programmes in the Eastern
neighbourhood, including Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and dedicated
youth mobility schemes, with simplified visa procedures and increased funding to
ensure that young people in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia (including
refugees and vulnerable groups) have meaningful opportunities for education,
training, and exchange within the EU;

18. Calls on the EU to grant observer status in the European Committee of the
Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee to Ukraine and Moldova,
and to maintain such status for Georgia only if democratic progress resumes;

19. Mandates full implementation of the EU's Common Maritime Agenda for the
Black Sea, with adequate funding for military mobility infrastructure, a
maritime security monitoring hub, and connectivity corridors;

20. Urges the EU to finalise a legal framework for the confiscation of frozen
Russian state assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine, extending this principle
to Belarusian regime assets.