



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC1 (decided on: 03/26/2026)

**Title:** Regarding multi-speed Europe

## Motion text

1 Resolution submitted by: JEF Political Commission 1 – Institutions and  
2 Governance

3 Adopted by the Federal Committee in Turku on 21 October 2018. Re-adopted by the  
4 online Federal Committee on 26 June 2021. Re-adopted and amended by the Federal  
5 Committee on 11 November 2023 in Madrid, Spain. Re-adopted and amended by the  
6 Federal Committee on 19 April 2026 in Belgrade, Serbia.

7 Jef Europe,

8 ● Reaffirming that the best and preferred solution to Europe's persistent  
9 problems is a European federation encompassing as many European states as  
10 possible, and that this should be the aim of the European Union as a whole;

11 ● Believing that joining the European Union should imply that the country is  
12 willing to politically integrate and to participate in a federal project;

13 ● Concerned about European integration having largely stalled since the Lisbon  
14 Treaty in 2007 and further integration being made difficult by the requirement  
15 of unanimity; ● Considering that differentiated integration (a "multi-speed  
16 Europe") could allow willing states to move forward without being held back by  
17 state governments not ready to accept further integration at this time;

18 ● Recalling that differentiated integration has in the past enabled the creation  
19 of a closer union, and its application has since gained more importance with the

20 Maastricht treaty and Amsterdam treaty, which introduced the eurozone and  
21 enhanced cooperation respectively;

22 ● Reaffirming that the euro is the single currency of the European Union and  
23 that in the long run, all Member States should join the Eurozone.

24 ● Aware of the fact that the EU remains the most important trade partner and  
25 provider of support for political and economic stability of neighbouring  
26 countries, and that EU membership has been and will continue to be a primary  
27 factor of geopolitical stability;

28 ● Bearing in mind the risk that encouraging the use of flexible ways of  
29 integration within the EU, if it is not supported by a concrete political  
30 vision, could lead to the stagnation or a progressive crumbling of the European  
31 project;

32 ● Mindful of the limitations of existing tools for differentiated integration,  
33 such as enhanced cooperation<sup>1</sup>.

34 JEF Europe therefore,

35 1. Encourages the Member States to actively pursue all forms of enhanced  
36 cooperation in those particularly problematic political sectors that have  
37 traditionally been exempted by the European integration process;

38 2. Calls upon the European Council to ensure that any attempt of having  
39 differentiated integration within the EU is supported by a clear and concrete  
40 political vision for the EU, that foresees the creation of a political  
41 institution based on federal aspects;

42 1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Title IV, Article 20,  
43 EUR-Lex, Publications Office of the European Union, EUR-Lex - 12016M020 - EN -  
44 EUR-Lex, 7 June 2016

45 3. Urges Eurozone countries to agree on permanent political integration and to  
46 function as a magnet for other countries, as the way to a multi-speed Europe  
47 that will not cause further fragmentation and divisions within the European  
48 Union;

49 4. Demands that the European Council and the European Commission ensure that any  
50 sort of new cooperation to be of an inclusive nature of enlargement, without

51 allocating a secondary status for the outer tier, and that all candidate  
52 countries can become part of it, if they wish, providing that they meet the  
53 relevant criteria;

54 5. Calls for a revision of the Treaties to enable the creation of a federal core  
55 and establishing a clear judicial system to resolve potential conflict of  
56 sovereignty between the federally integrated and non-participating members.

57 Therefore, in line with the principles stated above, JEF Europe:

58 6. Calls upon willing Member States to establish a federal core to proceed with  
59 political and economic integration, specifically proposing:

60 a. All members of this core group should join the Eurozone;

61 b. Creating a fiscal capacity with a dedicated budget, the federal right to levy  
62 taxes and the authority to borrow on capital markets;

63 c. Consolidating external representation under a single foreign policy; d.  
64 Transitioning from cooperation to a fully integrated European Defence Union with  
65 shared assets and command structures;

66 e. Transferring the management of external borders and migration policy from  
67 national authorities to the federal core;

68 f. Abolishing the requirement for unanimity in all Council decisions regarding  
69 the core group;

70 g. Institutionalising a governance structure where only representatives from the  
71 participating Member States hold voting rights on matters exclusive to the  
72 federal core;

73 h. All member states of this group unambiguously accept the absolute primacy of  
74 European Union law;

75 7. Urges the European Commission to use trade deals and partnerships, including  
76 association agreements, to foster integration of potential member states, with  
77 federation as the final goal.



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC1 (decided on: 03/26/2026)

**Title:** Regarding the Creation of a Fiscal Union

## Motion text

1 Resolution submitted by: JEF Political Commission 1 – Institutions and  
2 Governance

3 Adopted by the Federal Committee in London on 23 March 2019. Re-adopted and  
4 amended by the European Congress in Liège on 21 November 2021. Re-adopted and  
5 amended by the European Federal Committee in Tartu, Estonia on 14 April 2024.  
6 Re-adopted and amended by the European Federal Committee in Belgrade, Serbia on  
7 19 April 2026

8 JEF Europe,

9 ● Strongly convinced that for the EU to be able to act effectively, it must  
10 eliminate the principle of unanimity specifically for the introduction of new  
11 autonomous European taxes, while ensuring the harmonisation of tax systems1;

12 ● Stressing that a Fiscal Union and a centralised investment capacity could  
13 allow for economies of scale, thereby reducing the aggregate cost of public  
14 goods; ● Condemning the utter lack of transparency and democratic accountability  
15 in the EU budgetary process, whereby the European Parliament does not enjoy  
16 equal powers in determining the Multiannual Financial Framework or raising of  
17 revenues2; ● Highlighting the leverage held by Member States within the  
18 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), given that their national contributions  
19 constitute the primary source of the EU budget;

20 ● Convinced that the EU budget should be financed entirely by European

21 autonomous revenues rather than national contributions, to prevent Member States  
22 from using them as a tool for political leverage;

23 ● Noting with concern that Eurozone Member States are still exposed to  
24 asymmetric economic or financial shocks, especially the Member States in which  
25 public debt levels are still high and where governments are not endowed with  
26 enough fiscal space to enact counter-cyclical policies;

27 ● Convinced, therefore, of the need to strengthen the Eurozone through the  
28 creation of a real Fiscal Union;

29 ● Highlighting that cross-border tax schemes and fraud allow multinational  
30 corporations to free-ride on the public infrastructure and services of multiple  
31 Member States while contributing only to one;

32 ● Noting that while economic and taxation policies should follow the principle  
33 of subsidiarity, the Union must intervene when national frameworks fail to  
34 capture cross-border value creation, for example with an European Company Income  
35 Tax;

36 ● Convinced that the fragmentation of national tax systems and the lack of a  
37 common tax base impose higher compliance costs on European companies,  
38 undermining their cross-border expansion and the integrity of the Single Market;  
39

40 1 While the European Parliament acts as a joint authority for the annual budget,  
41 its influence is constrained by the MFF. The European Council and the Council  
42 retain primary control by setting the long-term political guidelines and  
43 spending ceilings. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the  
44 European Union, Part Six, Title II, Articles 312 and 314, EUR-Lex, Publications  
45 Office of the European Union, EUR-Lex - 12012E/TXT - EN - EUR-Lex, 26 October  
46 2012.2 Tax harmonization refers to the partial alignment of national tax laws  
47 and the unification of tax bases.

48 ● Stressing that the issuance of European debt should be coupled with a fiscal  
49 union, as borrowing without sovereign taxing power incurs higher costs and  
50 offers less favorable terms for most Member States than national debt;

51 ● Underlining the necessity of tightening national fiscal rules, as the  
52 transition toward a European fiscal union and common debt could induce moral  
53 hazard among Member States, threatening the stability of the single currency;

54 ● Believing that the mutualization of national debt into a single European  
55 instrument will gain political viability only once Member States achieve  
56 comparable debt-to-GDP ratios, thereby eliminating the risk of a free lunch and  
57 ensuring equitable risk-sharing;

58 JEF Europe, therefore, calls the European Council to create a Fiscal Union  
59 structured around:

60 1. Fiscal capacity, which is the power to raise taxes through an European Tax  
61 Authority, consisting only of autonomous revenues to ensure the Union possesses  
62 the independent resources necessary to fulfill its mandates without relying on  
63 national contributions;

64 2. Budgetary capacity providing macroeconomic stabilization and funding  
65 essential European public goods, such as common defense and energy  
66 infrastructure; 3. Permanent borrowing capacity to issue sovereign debt,  
67 providing a mechanism to manage economic shocks;

68 4. Tightened fiscal rules at the national level to ensure long-term  
69 sustainability and prevent moral hazard within the shared fiscal framework;

70 5. The democratic empowerment of the European Parliament, granting it the right  
71 to initiate and amend fiscal proposals, ensuring that new European taxes are  
72 subject to direct parliamentary oversight and approval;

73 6. Harmonization of national tax bases to reduce the administrative burdens and  
74 market distortions caused by divergent fiscal rules.



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC1 (decided on: 03/26/2026)

**Title:** Regarding the Protection of the Rule of Law

## Motion text

1 Resolution submitted by: JEF Political Commission 1 – Institutions and  
2 Governance

3 Adopted by the Federal Committee in London on 23 March 2019. Re-adopted and  
4 amended by the European Congress in Liège on 21 November 2021. Re-adopted and  
5 amended by the European Federal Committee in Tartu, Estonia on 14 April 2024.  
6 Re-adopted and amended by the European Federal Committee in Belgrade, Serbia on  
7 19 April 2026.

- 8 ● Defining rule of law as a principle of governance where all entities are held  
9 accountable to laws that ensure the separation of powers, prevent systematic  
10 violations through universal legal consequences, and uphold the core values of  
11 democracy, human dignity, and fundamental rights;
- 12 ● Strongly emphasising the rule of law as one of the core principles which the  
13 European Union is built upon, as outlined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU),  
14 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Charter of  
15 Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
- 16 ● Alarmed by the increase in violations of the rule of law especially in the  
17 area of fundamental civil rights and political freedoms in EU Member States  
18 which has been seen leading to cases of growing authoritarianism such as in  
19 Hungary;
- 20 ● Concerned about how governments and political parties instil and exploit

21 citizens' fears and uncertainties in order to justify measures which undermine  
22 the basic principles of democracy and limit civil liberties;

23 ● Observing a gap between the Copenhagen Criteria and the Rule of Law Framework,  
24 that fails to prevent a decline in those same standards once a country is  
25 admitted as a member state;

26 ● Stressing that when judicial questions are not addressed by an independent  
27 court, they become vulnerable to political pressure and the dynamics of  
28 consensus; ● Considering that the EU's legal framework still remains ill-  
29 equipped to deal with the violation of the rule of law in Member States; in  
30 particular, the Rule of Law procedure, outlined in Art. 7 of the TEU, whereby  
31 the EU is practically unable to sanction gross violations of EU fundamental  
32 values in the Member States, requiring a unanimous vote in the Council for  
33 sanctions to be activated;

34 ● Recognising that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is responsible for  
35 matters concerning state and European law to ensure uniform application across  
36 the Union, whereas the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) serves as a court  
37 of last appeal for citizens whose fundamental human rights have been violated;

38 ● Further recognising that the ECJ acts as the final arbiter for the  
39 interpretation and uniform application of EU law, thereby driving European  
40 integration and reinforcing the supranational character of the Union;

41 ● Alarmed by the insufficient application of the conditionality regime that has  
42 been put in place since 2021, between European funds paid out to certain Member  
43 States and the state of the rule of law in these respective Member States;

44 ● Further alarmed by the possibility of blackmail due to the unanimity principle  
45 when Member States breaking the rule of law condition their support on ending an  
46 Art. 7 procedure or unfreezing funds, such as Hungary blocking the EU's Ukraine  
47 aid packages;

48 ● Noting with concern that permanent or long-term damage to a Member State's  
49 democratic framework may occur even during short periods of rule of law breaches  
50 and regretting that the EU process of assessing rule of law violations takes too  
51 much time;

52 ● Reaffirming how a Federal Europe should exist only on the basis of the rule of  
53 law and solid democratic structures.

55 1) The Copenhagen Criteria are the requirements for joining the EU. The Rule of  
56 Law Framework is the mechanism intended to maintain these standards after  
57 membership, but it lacks the effective enforcement power seen in the pre-  
58 accession phase

59 JEF Europe therefore,

60 1. Calls on the governments of the Member States for Treaty changes to the  
61 procedure set out in Article 7 TEU with the goal of empowering the Council, the  
62 European Parliament, and the Commission to bring actions concerning a Member  
63 State's violations directly before the

64 Court of Justice, thereby shifting the decisive role from a strictly political  
65 process to an impartial judicial body;

66 2. Further calls on the governments of the Member States to eliminate the  
67 unanimity requirement within the Article 7 procedures and to instead establish a  
68 requirement for a qualified majority in the Council and a majority of members in  
69 the European Parliament<sup>2</sup>;

70 3. Calls upon the European commission to limit the dialogue procedure of the  
71 Rule of Law Framework with national governments who violate the rule of law to a  
72 strict timeframe;

73 4. Calls on all the European political parties and families and their  
74 representatives to take responsibility for the respective national parties being  
75 committed to European values and the rule of law;

76 5. Demands that Member States implement the decisions of the European Court of  
77 Human Rights as swiftly as possible;

78 6. Demands that all Member States formally acknowledge the primacy of EU law,  
79 while ensuring that ECJ judgments are directly applicable and binding.

80 2) Points 1 and 2 are inspired by the EP resolution of 22 November 2023.  
81 Amendment 11 proposes that the Council, acting by qualified majority, the  
82 Parliament, or the Commission may submit an application to the Court of Justice  
83 regarding serious and persistent breaches of Article 2 values Source: European  
84 Parliament resolution of 22 November 2023 (2022/2051(INL))



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC2 (decided on: 03/29/2026)

**Title:** **Strengthening and Safeguarding Free Movement within the European Union and the Future of Schengen**

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## Motion text

1 Resolution submitted by: JEF Political Commission 2 – Internal European Policy

2 Adopted by the Federal Committee in Turku on 21 October 2018. Re-adopted by the  
3 online Federal Committee on 26 June 2021. Re-adopted and amended by the Federal  
4 Committee on 11 November 2023 in Madrid Spain. Re-adopted and amended by the  
5 Federal Committee on 19 April 2026 in Belgrade, Serbia.

6 Free movement of citizens and the Schengen Agreements are two of the proudest  
7 achievements of the European Union. However, limits still exist and challenges  
8 are mounting.

9 JEF Europe,

10 ● Recognising free movement of persons in the EU as one of the four important  
11 pillars of the Single European Market that constitutes one of the core  
12 achievements of European integration so far;

13 ● Reiterating that the free movement of EU workers is a fundamental principle of  
14 European law enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the  
15 European Union (TFEU) and developed by EU secondary legislation, such as  
16 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 which requires equal treatment with regard to social  
17 advantages, and the Case law of the Court of Justice;

- 18 ● Noting with appreciation that the Schengen Agreement has led to positive  
19 intercultural exchange, cooperation and contributes to economic development; ●  
20 Noting with concern the growing number of member states that are reintroducing  
21 border controls;
- 22 ● Further concerned by the reasons EU Member States use to justify the  
23 reintroduction or prolongation of temporary internal border controls still  
24 reflecting crisis-mode policy-making on migration, asylum and borders often  
25 explicitly and erroneously linking the (secondary) movements of migrants to  
26 terrorism;
- 27 ● Reiterates that the Schengen Area is to be protected and guaranteed and thus  
28 should be separated from negotiations related to external policies and Member  
29 States' home affairs which lay beyond the scope of articles 25-29 of the  
30 Schengen Border Code;
- 31 ● Emphasising the crucial necessity for democratic accountability in border  
32 control and Frontex operations, which must be rooted in fundamental EU values,  
33 because protecting the Schengen Area must never serve as a pretext for policies  
34 or practices that do not uphold human rights;
- 35 ● Stressing the fact that despite the understandable desire to feel secure,  
36 reintroducing border controls does not solve the problem of terrorism, rather,  
37 is detrimental to EU citizens, who cannot take advantage of the free movement  
38 within the Schengen area;
- 39 ● Noting that, in many cases, the temporary reintroduction of border controls is  
40 transforming into permanent restrictions to the free movement of citizens within  
41 the EU;
- 42 ● Noticing that the future of Schengen and non-restricted free movement in the  
43 EU has been strongly affected by the inability of EU member states to commonly  
44 manage the external borders and the lack of a united approach to immigration of  
45 non-EU citizens;
- 46 ● Emphasising the fact that the presence of migration flows is not a crisis, but  
47 a structural fact, that needs longer term, structural solutions;
- 48 ● Considering that in the European Federation internal borders should only have  
49 administrative value, and internal border controls would have no place in the  
50 Federation;

51 ● Deeply concerned about the construction of border fences which challenges the  
52 very fundamentals of the Schengen Agreement and the European Project as a whole;  
53 ● Rejecting the negative and destructive discourse driven by some political  
54 forces and

55 leaders about the arrival of refugees, and the labelling of free movement as  
56 'welfare tourism';

57 ● Regretting the instrumentalisation of problems arising from poor  
58 implementation of the freedom of movement by governments and parties in  
59 different member states; ● Deploring that the freedom of movement and  
60 establishment in another Member State for European citizens is limited by  
61 fragmented rules and missing simplification of procedures, preventing them from  
62 properly asserting their rights;

63 ● Recalling JEF resolution "For a common migration and asylum policy",  
64 "Promoting Youth Labour Mobility and Tackling Youth Unemployment in Europe",  
65 "Calling for a fully fledged Health Union for the European Union", "Advancing  
66 the European Union's Social Dimension", "On the creation of a Fiscal Union in  
67 the Eurozone", "Strengthening European Citizenship Education", "Patching the  
68 holes in the EU fabric: a federal Switzerland in a federal Europe".

69 JEF Europe therefore:

70 1. Demands the immediate and full re-establishment of the freedom to travel  
71 within the Schengen area without restrictions;

72 2. Calls upon the Member States to implement a coherent and effective federal  
73 border policy including cooperation in security and information exchange with  
74 adequate financial capacities to achieve their mandate of fully respecting EU  
75 borders and the asylum acquis, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights;

76 3. Calls for comprehensive and coherent policies on welfare, asylum, and border  
77 management, and stresses the importance of a holistic, well-coordinated and  
78 human rights-based approach to ensure the security, welfare, and prosperity of  
79 both EU citizens and those seeking refuge within its borders;

80 4. Asks the Commission, the European Parliament as well as the Member States to  
81 clearly refute common misconceptions about free movement by fully pointing out  
82 already existing possibilities within European law that allow for nuanced  
83 approaches to cross-border migration;

- 84 **5. Calls for the completion of a fully European Citizenship that allows for**  
85 **truly free movement within the Union through the seamless portability of social**  
86 **rights, effectively establishing a single status for all residents instead of a**  
87 **sum of national citizenships;**
- 88 **6. Demands that all physical walls, fences, and barriers of any sort established**  
89 **between EU Member States be torn down, noting the negative messages such**  
90 **obstructions send and the dark connotations of their historical predecessors;**
- 91 **7. Urges European institutions to enforce EU law by opening infringement**  
92 **procedures against those Member States that abuse the notion of emergency**  
93 **situation to establish border controls within the Union;**
- 94 **8. Calls for compensatory payments that Member States establishing border**  
95 **controls should be required to pay to compensate the Union of any economic**  
96 **losses related to the border controls;**
- 97 **9. Calls for the introduction of strong non-monetary instruments that the**  
98 **European Commission should use to strictly limit and when necessary formally**  
99 **oppose unjustified suspensions of internal border controls by Member States**  
100 **under the Schengen Framework;**
- 101 **10. Demands all EU Institutions to continue to support measures aimed at**  
102 **improving the access to free movement of people, such as the free movement of**  
103 **workers and students;**
- 104 **11. Demands that Member States respect the social rights of all citizens who**  
105 **have the right to freely move within the Union and thus help to concretely**  
106 **implement and guarantee the European Pillar of Social Rights;**
- 107 **12. Demands that public authorities guarantee that mobile and cross-border**  
108 **citizens benefit from their welfare and social rights when dealing with lower**  
109 **local authorities according to the principle of subsidiarity.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC2 (decided on: 03/29/2026)

**Title:** Towards a green, globally competitive and digital European industry

## Motion text

1 Submitted by Political Commission 2: Internal European Affairs

2 Adopted by the Federal Committee on 11 November 2023 in Madrid, Spain. Re-  
3 adopted and amended by the Federal Committee on 19 April 2026 in Belgrade,  
4 Serbia.

5 European industry stands at a turning point. High energy costs, geopolitical  
6 tensions and growing global subsidy races are putting pressure on Europe's  
7 competitiveness. At the same time, ambitious climate and digital goals require  
8 profound transformation.

9 JEF Europe,

10 ● Recognising that a strong and innovative industrial base is fundamental to  
11 Europe's prosperity, social stability and strategic autonomy, providing the  
12 technologies, infrastructure and production capacities necessary to drive the  
13 green and digital transitions and ensure long term economic resilience;

14 ● Recalling that European industry provides 35 million jobs, accounts for 80% of  
15 goods exports, 22.3% of GDP and is the key driver for the EU's position as a top  
16 global provider of high-tech products;

17 ● Emphasising that only a Federal Europe, endowed with autonomous fiscal  
18 authority, possesses the capacity to deploy the resources necessary for the

19 renewal of European industry;

20 ● Highlighting the role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often  
21 acting as key local suppliers;

22 ● Welcoming the Clean Industrial Deal as the EU's renewed framework to  
23 strengthen industrial competitiveness while accelerating decarbonisation,  
24 reinforcing the Single Market and scaling up clean technologies, in line with  
25 the EU's climate objectives;

26 ● Welcoming the implementation of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting  
27 Directive (CSRD) requiring large companies to disclose environmental, social and  
28 governance information according to the European Sustainability Reporting  
29 Standards (ESRS), enhancing transparency and accountability on sustainability  
30 issues;

31 ● Acknowledging that industrial activities are also a strong driver of  
32 environmental pollution and carbon emissions;

33 ● Deeply convinced that Europe's industry can and should be transformed to meet  
34 the Paris Agreement, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), binding  
35 emissions targets and the goal of climate neutrality by 2050 set in the EU  
36 climate law, and initiatives such as the European Green Deal;

37 ● Emphasising the need to protect workers' health, safety and well being in the  
38 European industry, while addressing job losses, precarious employment models,  
39 and

40 the social consequences of globalisation and delocalisation that undermine the  
41 stability and status of industrial workers and young people;

42 ● Acknowledging that the EU's industrial and economic power translates into  
43 normative power, and that all these powers can be used to contribute to global  
44 development, as well as promote human rights and environmental justice in the  
45 world through smart trade agreements;

46 ● Welcoming the entry into force of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism  
47 (CBAM), the strengthened Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the Corporate  
48 Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, stressing the need for their effective  
49 implementation to prevent carbon leakage, ensure respect for human rights,  
50 environmental standards in global supply chains and uphold fair competition;

- 51 ● Recognising that increasingly global and complex value chains create strategic  
52 dependencies, reduce economic resilience and make it harder to enforce fair  
53 competition and sustainable standards;
- 54 ● Deeply concerned about the potential misuse of industrial policy as a weapon  
55 by revisionist autocracies, through restrictions on the export of critical raw  
56 materials, energy sources or other key technologies or services;
- 57 ● Welcoming the European Commission's initiatives to strengthen Europe's open  
58 strategic autonomy including the launch of Important Projects of Common European  
59 Interest (IPCEIs) in key strategic sectors such as microelectronics, hydrogen  
60 and batteries, mobilising an expected total of EUR 92.2 billion in public and  
61 private investment, as well as the in depth review of strategic areas to  
62 identify and reduce critical dependencies in European supply chains;
- 63 ● Recognising the EU's shift towards a more strategic industrial and trade  
64 policy, illustrated by recent initiatives such as the Industrial Accelerator  
65 Act, which seek to strengthen resilient clean technology supply chains and  
66 prioritise cooperation with trusted economic partners;
- 67 ● Emphasising that Europe's future industry depends on sufficient investment in  
68 new innovations, technology, Research and Development (R&D) as well as skill  
69 training, which should be a joint European endeavour to boost competitiveness,  
70 specialisation and sustainability;
- 71 ● Recognising that in high-tech fields in particular, much innovation is done by  
72 large companies, and thus it may be necessary to accept more mergers between  
73 European companies to create European champions in key industries;
- 74 ● Reaffirming JEF Europe's resolutions that are interconnected, complement the  
75 need for an industrial transition and propose concrete solutions: "A European  
76 Transition to a Circular Economy", "Calling for an ethical and efficient EU  
77 policy framework on Artificial Intelligence", "For a United Digital Europe",  
78 "Environment does not stop at borders: Towards a Sustainable Europe and a  
79 Sustainable Global Climate Policy", "Better integrated and more sustainable  
80 mobility infrastructure for an Ever Closer Union", ; "Advancing the European  
81 Union's Social Dimension", "On the creation of a Fiscal Union in the Eurozone",  
82 and "Towards sustainable, reliable and affordable energy for Europe".

83 JEF Europe therefore:

84 1. Calls on the European industry to accelerate investment in decarbonisation,

85 **digitalisation and strategic value chains to secure Europe's industrial**  
86 **leadership and strategic autonomy by 2030;**

87 **2. Envisions a European clean industrial transformation that scales up net-zero**  
88 **technologies, advanced manufacturing and secures critical infrastructure,**  
89 **strengthening Europe's resilience in key sectors;**

90 **3. Calls for the European Commission and Member States to safeguard the**  
91 **integrity of the Single Market through the elimination of remaining trade**  
92 **barriers, ensuring consistent enforcement of EU competition and merger rules**  
93 **whilst maintaining a level playing field within the EU and globally;**

94 **4. Calls on the EU to better coordinate with its global partners and avoid**  
95 **expensive subsidy races in areas where it is desirable to diversify our supply**  
96 **or reduce our strategic dependency, such as, but not limited to, battery**  
97 **technology, microchips, critical raw materials, and energy sources;**

98 **5. Supports a European relocalisation of vital industrial activities to provide**  
99 **for more of Europe's own consumption, ensuring shorter and more resilient supply**  
100 **chains and creating long-term, well-paid jobs for European workers;**

101 **6. Calls on the EU and Member States to ensure robust implementation of the**  
102 **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), using its revenues to support the**  
103 **decarbonisation of energy intensive industries while preserving competitiveness**  
104 **and avoiding unnecessary trade disputes;**

105 **7. Calls on the EU, Member States and industries for a more decisive move**  
106 **towards a circular economy through the implementation of a cascading use and**  
107 **cradle-to-cradle principles in our production chains, waste management and**  
108 **through a life-cycle assessment of critical components and raw materials;**

109 **8. Urges the EU to defend high social and environmental standards in its trade**  
110 **policy without descending into protectionism, by coupling ambitious climate**  
111 **policies with active diplomacy to avoid retaliation;**

112 **9. Urges the European Commission to develop concrete measures to reduce the use**  
113 **of critical raw materials, batteries and plastics where sustainable alternatives**  
114 **exist, to strengthen recycling and recovery processes like chemical recycling**  
115 **and substitution with circular materials, and to reduce the export of valuable**  
116 **waste materials in order to retain resources within the EU;**

117 **10. Calls upon the European Commission to ensure that the extraction and**  
118 **processing of natural resources, within and outside the EU, fully respect**  
119 **environmental standards such as the DNSH principle as well as the rights of**  
120 **local communities and indigenous people, guaranteeing their participation in**  
121 **decision making processes;**

122 **11. Calls upon the EU and Member States to develop on their territories critical**  
123 **raw material extraction that is safe, as well as socially and environmentally**  
124 **responsible, to boost our own production and reduce our need for imports as well**  
125 **as our dependencies;**

126 **12. Expects the EU's and Member States' industrial strategies to support the**  
127 **fight against in-work poverty and inequality, as well as to ensure strong and**  
128 **equitable workers' rights with equal access and opportunities guaranteed for,**  
129 **but not limited to, women, minority workers, and young people;**

130 **13. Calls for EU funds aimed at industrial transition, such as the Just**  
131 **Transition Fund, to become real funds of solidarity, that ensure fair**  
132 **distribution across society, between regions and countries, underlining the**  
133 **importance of European territorial cohesion;**

134 **14. Encourages the EU and the Member States to strengthen support for startups,**  
135 **SMEs and larger companies by fostering already existing and emerging networks**  
136 **across Europe, promoting the exchange of knowledge and best practices on**  
137 **sustainable digitalisation as well as enhancing their capacity to grow and**  
138 **compete globally;**

139 **15. Calls for the EU to significantly strengthen and expand sovereign European**  
140 **investment instruments, including dedicated technology sovereignty funds, to**  
141 **support the development and scaling of strategic digital and industrial**  
142 **technologies, ensure European ownership of critical assets, and reduce**  
143 **dependency on non-European capital and investors.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC3 (decided on: 03/30/2026)

**Title:** For a common migration and asylum policy

## Motion text

1 11 November 2023 (lapsing). Renewed for Federal Committee April 2026 Submitted  
2 by Political Commission 3: External Affairs & Global Governance

3 Conflicts, political turmoil, economic disparities as well as climate change  
4 generate migration towards Europe. The European Union (EU), so far, has proven  
5 itself totally unprepared to tackle the human rights violations and humanitarian  
6 crisis faced by refugees and migrants, especially at its external borders.  
7 Member States are reacting unilaterally and against the common European  
8 interest. Unilateral actions are ineffective and damaging to major European  
9 achievements and values, such as the Schengen Agreement, peaceful cooperation  
10 between Member States and human rights. The Young European Federalists urges the  
11 EU to give a stronger common response to this global challenge, in the field of  
12 migration, asylum and border control policies.

13 JEF Europe,

14 1. Acknowledging that recent refugee and migration patterns have been markedly  
15 different in both character and impact on different Member States;

16 2. Alarmed by the persisting human rights violations and humanitarian crises  
17 faced by migrants and refugees in Europe, especially taking into account wars  
18 and instability;

19 3. Noting that conflicts, war, human rights abuses, political persecution, lack  
20 of perspectives, climate change and growing economic disparities will continue

21 to lead to migrant and refugee arrivals in Europe if these root causes of  
22 migration are not seriously addressed;

23 4. Acknowledging that the charge of welcoming refugees is left to countries  
24 neighbouring conflicts or other humanitarian disasters and that these countries  
25 are often hosting numbers far beyond their capacities;

26 5. Highlights the need for further effective and tangible solidarity with Member  
27 States on the Union's external borders experiencing most of the arrivals to  
28 ensure that they can provide the highest standards of dignified immediate  
29 reception;

30 6. Deploring that the Member States have sidelined the EU in migration and have  
31 been unwilling to develop a serious common strategy, have been blocking  
32 Commission proposals for a common approach and have prioritised a shallow and  
33 populist understanding of the "national interest" at the cost of effective and  
34 reasonable common migration and asylum policy;

35 7. Further deploring that the present decision-making procedures are ineffective  
36 and exploitable, allowing a small minority, even a single bad-faith actor, to  
37 stall decision making indefinitely;

38 8. Believing that the Schengen area and the freedom of movement are two of the  
39 greatest achievements of the EU and that they should not only be preserved, but  
40 expanded;

41 9. Noting the successful conclusion and adoption of the EU Pact on Migration and  
42 Asylum, which will become applicable as of mid-2026, and acknowledging the  
43 decrease in irregular arrivals and asylum applications recorded in 2025, which  
44 has created a window for effective implementation;

45 10. Noting with concern the European Parliament's approval of amendments  
46 broadening the "safe third country" concept, removing the requirement of a link  
47 between the asylum seeker and the country of transfer, and eliminating the  
48 suspensive effect of appeals, thereby weakening procedural safeguards and  
49 triggering a race to the bottom in migrant protection standards;

50 11. Deeply concerned by the European Parliament's approval of a new return  
51 regulation allowing detention of migrants, including families and minors, for  
52 extended periods, expanding data surveillance, and paving the way for offshore  
53 deportation centres, which raises serious concerns about compliance with  
54 fundamental rights;

55 **12. Deploring that the EU is outsourcing migration management flows by entering**  
56 **into agreements with third countries (Albania, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia**  
57 **and Türkiye) often without adequate human rights safeguards;**

58 **13. Deploring the EU's plans to fund a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center in**  
59 **eastern Libya under Commander Khalifa Haftar's control, which would extend the**  
60 **"pullback mechanism" already operating in western Libya, resulting in**  
61 **interceptions at sea and returns to Libyan authorities where migrants face**  
62 **arbitrary detention, extortion, and inhuman treatment;**

63 **14. Condemning the continued formal and informal practices of migration**  
64 **externalisation that actively subvert the principle of non-refoulement,**  
65 **including pushbacks, as documented in judgments of the Court of Justice of the**  
66 **European Union, which strengthened Frontex's legal responsibility in pushback**  
67 **operations;**

68 **15. Regretting that the EU has given billions of euros to Türkiye since March**  
69 **2016 to detain migrants and refugees in degrading conditions, while**  
70 **acknowledging that the agreement helped to control migration streams at its**  
71 **peak;**

72 **16. Condemning the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and**  
73 **Tunisia, signed in July 2023 which paid little regard to the ongoing gross human**  
74 **rights**

75 **abuses by the regime against asylum seekers in the country as well as against**  
76 **its own citizens;**

77 **17. Noting the launch of the new Mediterranean Pact, which aims to strengthen**  
78 **ties with Mediterranean countries, while civil society organisations have raised**  
79 **concerns about limited consultation and insufficient attention to human rights;**

80 **18. Condemning smugglers of migrants and human traffickers for the inhuman**  
81 **treatment, exploitation and endangerment of innocent lives purely for financial**  
82 **profit;**

83 **19. Further concerned that externalisation strategies might be more broadly**  
84 **replicated by other countries bordering the EU, instrumentalising refugees and**  
85 **migrants for financial gain and leverage over the EU;**

86 **20. Deeply concerned that some Member States have denied their responsibility,**

87 refused to welcome in their ports ships rescuing the lives of migrants and  
88 refugees, and sometimes have gone as far as actively repelling ships, putting  
89 lives at risk and possibly breaching international law;

90 21. Convinced that EU-led search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean and  
91 in the Aegean Sea are necessary to save lives;

92 22. Condemning the criminalisation of NGOs operating in search and rescue  
93 activities in the Mediterranean Sea made by several EU Member States'  
94 governments;

95 23. Emphasising that the fundamental rights and duties of a human being declared  
96 in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human  
97 Rights, the 1951 Geneva Convention and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the  
98 European Union must always be respected;

99 24. Recognising that various pieces of EU legislation have been adopted in order  
100 to create a common asylum policy in line with the objective set out in Article  
101 78 TFEU, including Directive 2011/95 ("Qualification Directive") and Directive  
102 2013/33 ("Reception Conditions Directive");

103 25. Welcoming the European Commission's first European Asylum and Migration  
104 Management Strategy, presented in early 2026, which sets out a five-year  
105 framework to support Pact implementation;

106 26. Welcoming the establishment of the EU Talent Pool in late 2025, the first  
107 EU-wide platform supporting international recruitment of skills and talent from  
108 third countries at all skill levels, and the opening of the European Legal  
109 Gateway Office in India in early 2026 to facilitate legal migration pathways for  
110 ICT professionals, students, and researchers;

111 27. Noting the European Commission's new visa and migration strategy unveiled in  
112 early 2026, which proposes enhanced control of visa-free regimes, new  
113 restrictive measures for non-cooperative states on readmission, and prioritised  
114 visa procedures for "high value-added" individuals at EU level;

115 28. Acknowledging that Member States have committed significantly fewer  
116 resettlement places for 2026-2027 compared to previous years, and that  
117 relocation commitments have similarly fallen short of the European Commission's  
118 targets, while return rates have increased in recent years.

119 **JEF Europe, therefore,**

120 **1. Insists on the need for a common EU policy on migration, asylum, subsidiary**  
121 **protection and temporary protection which fully complies with binding**  
122 **obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and respects the non-**  
123 **refoulement principle;**

124 **2. Mandates the EU and its Member States to ensure the swift and effective**  
125 **implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will become applicable**  
126 **in mid-2026, with a focus on operational readiness at borders, fair and**  
127 **efficient procedures, and credible solidarity mechanisms;**

128 **3. Demands that the solidarity mechanism under the Pact be implemented in a way**  
129 **that ensures genuine responsibility sharing between Member States, with**  
130 **transparent reporting on relocations, financial contributions, and alternative**  
131 **solidarity measures;**

132 **4. Requires the European Commission to closely monitor the implementation of the**  
133 **Pact and to consider infringement procedures against Member States that fail to**  
134 **comply with their obligations, including respect for human rights;**

135 **5. Exhorts the EU to accelerate the phasing out of the Dublin regulations and**  
136 **adopt a true European asylum policy, fully respecting EU values, human rights**  
137 **and Articles 78–80 TFEU, and relying on solidarity and responsibility sharing as**  
138 **well as on extra assistance to the countries of entry;**

139 **6. Calls on the EU to include a European refugee status for political dissidents**  
140 **in its migration and asylum policies;**

141 **7. Demands that in the future, asylum decisions and decisions on return be taken**  
142 **based on unified EU-wide standards, rather than disparate standards defined at**  
143 **the national level;**

144 **8. Furthermore, calls on the European Commission to consider infringement**  
145 **procedures and financial sanctions against non-compliant Member States in the**  
146 **framework of migration and asylum policies;**

147 **9. Urges the EU to stop using readmission agreements as the main tool to fight**  
148 **irregular immigration, as this encourages violations of human rights such as the**  
149 **non-refoulement principle guaranteed by the 1951 Geneva Convention;**

- 150 **10. Calls for an EU policy for the Mediterranean region and beyond, ensuring**  
151 **broad and intensified cooperation with third countries through the Union for the**  
152 **Mediterranean and other multilateral fora in order to fight human trafficking**  
153 **networks, while insisting that such cooperation must include binding human**  
154 **rights clauses, independent monitoring mechanisms, and oversight by the European**  
155 **Parliament;**
- 156 **11. Demands that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) operates**  
157 **in full compliance with EU values and fundamental rights, and that the agency's**  
158 **legal responsibility for pushback operations, as affirmed by the Court of**  
159 **Justice of the European Union, is fully respected and enforced;**
- 160 **12. Insists that Frontex is tasked with search and rescue in the Mediterranean**  
161 **and the Aegean Sea and demands the transformation of Operation Themis into a**  
162 **wider and focused EU search and rescue operation of people in distress;**
- 163 **13. Mandates the establishment of a dedicated, civilian-led EU Sea Rescue**  
164 **Agency, separate from Frontex, with a sole mandate to coordinate and conduct**  
165 **search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, ensuring that lifesaving is**  
166 **not subordinated to border control objectives;**
- 167 **14. Invites the EU and its Member States to provide transit countries with**  
168 **extended assistance and further humanitarian supplies to be dedicated to the**  
169 **reception of asylum seekers and refugees;**
- 170 **15. Calls on the EU to enhance legal and humanitarian pathways to safely reach**  
171 **the EU, without being forced to rely on illegal human trafficking, such as**  
172 **humanitarian visas to refugees;**
- 173 **16. Calls for the establishment of common European asylum offices in third**  
174 **countries that respect European standards of treatment and human dignity;**
- 175 **17. Demands with immediate effect the decriminalisation of private sea rescue by**  
176 **EU states;**
- 177 **18. Encourages the EU to open legal channels for economic migration;**
- 178 **19. Requires the further expansion of legal migration pathways, including**  
179 **through the EU Talent Pool, the European Legal Gateway Office model, and Talent**  
180 **Partnerships with third countries, with a focus on matching skills with labour**  
181 **market needs while ensuring fair recruitment practices and protection of**

182 workers' rights;

183 **20. Demands the EU to further facilitate cross-border mobility for cultural and**  
184 **educational exchanges with third-country nationals;**

185 **21. Condemns any proposal regarding migration and asylum policy that relies on**  
186 **building walls and fences, and urges the EU and its Member States to build an**  
187 **open continent instead of a Fortress Europe and internal barriers;**

188 **22. Demands that the Schengen Agreements are safeguarded at all times, borders**  
189 **be reopened where they have been closed and border controls are put to an end**  
190 **without delay;**

191 **23. Mandates the EU to review and renegotiate externalisation agreements with**  
192 **third countries, including the EU-Türkiye deal and the Memorandum of**  
193 **Understanding with Tunisia, to ensure they fully respect the 1951 Geneva**  
194 **Convention, include binding human rights clauses, and provide for independent**  
195 **monitoring and accountability mechanisms;**

196 **24. Urges the EU to withdraw from plans to fund maritime control centres in**  
197 **Libya, including the proposed centre in Benghazi, given documented human rights**  
198 **abuses by Libyan authorities and militias, and to instead prioritise dedicated**  
199 **EU-led search and rescue operations;**

200 **25. Demands significantly stronger political will towards the Union for the**  
201 **Mediterranean (UfM), among other fora, to forge the necessary partnerships with**  
202 **Southern Neighbourhood states needed to overcome the short-term vision of the EU**  
203 **and its Member States to make development assistance primarily conditional on**  
204 **migration cooperation to the detriment of EU values as well as the quality of**  
205 **broader development goals;**

206 **26. Urges European leaders to change radically their migration and asylum**  
207 **narratives to make space for more sustainable and humane approaches;**

208 **27. Commits itself to explore opportunities for cooperation and exchange with**  
209 **young migrants and youth organisations working with refugees and migrants;**

210 **28. Requires the establishment of effective mechanisms to assess and match the**  
211 **skills of migrants with the labour market needs of Member States, facilitating**  
212 **seamless integration and contributing to the overall prosperity of the EU;**

213 **29. Mandates Member States to prioritise integration policies, including**  
214 **language training, education, housing, and labour market access, as essential**  
215 **components of a sustainable migration system that ensures social cohesion and**  
216 **public confidence;**

217 **30. Demands the expansion of youth mobility and civic engagement programmes,**  
218 **ensuring that refugees and vulnerable groups have access to student exchanges,**  
219 **volunteering initiatives, and youth projects with optional financial support**  
220 **from the EU.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC3 (decided on: 03/30/2026)

**Title:** Future of the Eastern Partnership: a new European strategy for the East

## Motion text

1 11 November 2023 (lapsing). Renewed for Federal Committee April 2026 Submitted  
2 by Political Commission 3: External Affairs & Global Governance

3 The Eastern Partnership (EaP), within the framework of the European  
4 Neighbourhood Policy, is a policy of strategic interest to the European Union  
5 (EU) and should therefore be reformed so that it may enable an even greater  
6 level of cooperation. EaP countries and their citizens have a wish for closer  
7 European integration. However, the region can no longer be treated as a single

8 bloc: it now consists of EU accession candidates (Ukraine, Moldova), a country  
9 whose European path is blocked by its own government, despite its candidate  
10 status (Georgia), a state pivoting towards the EU while maintaining complex  
11 economic ties with Russia (Armenia), an authoritarian energy partner  
12 (Azerbaijan), and a country under effective Russian occupation (Belarus). Russia  
13 still harbours imperialist ambitions on former Soviet republics, instead of  
14 respecting their independence and freedom to choose their own future. Russia's  
15 continued imperialist agenda prevents peaceful cooperation between the Russian  
16 Federation and the European Union while also sowing discontent and instability  
17 in the EaP countries.

18 The European Union should demonstrate that it is the main partner for dialogue  
19 and cooperation with EaP countries, as well as the best equipped global actor to  
20 guarantee peace, stability, progress and respect for democracy and human rights.  
21 The EU must respond with a differentiated strategy that offers credible  
22 accession perspectives to willing reformers, deepens security cooperation with

23 vulnerable partners, and supports civil society under authoritarian rule. JEF  
24 Europe therefore calls for a radical shift in the EU's foreign policy towards  
25 the Eastern Partnership based on differentiation, conditionality, and genuine  
26 solidarity.

27 JEF Europe,

28 1. Recalling JEF Europe's resolutions, a) "For a common European response to the  
29 invasion of Ukraine and the future of Ukraine"; b) "The EU response to the  
30 Russian Federation's aggression of Ukraine", strongly condemning Russia's full-  
31 scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year, and urging for stronger EU  
32 support to Ukraine, including military, financial, and humanitarian assistance;

33 2. Noting with frustration the limits of the EU's foreign policy and the related  
34 unanimity rule in the framework of the ENP, which remains too often constrained  
35 and paralysed by the conflicting positions of the Member States in the Council,  
36 allowing a single country to block sanctions, enlargement steps, or crisis  
37 responses;

38 3. Deeply concerned about the human toll of active and unresolved conflicts  
39 across the region, including Russia's war against Ukraine, the continued  
40 occupation of Georgian

41 territories, Azerbaijan's ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian  
42 population, and the frozen conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic  
43 of Moldova;

44 4. Denouncing Russia's comprehensive destabilisation campaign aimed at  
45 undermining EaP countries through military aggression, hybrid attacks, election  
46 interference, disinformation, energy blackmail, trade embargoes, and the  
47 conclusion of integration treaties with separatist or breakaway regions, such as  
48 South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia,  
49 and Kherson;

50 5. Noting with regret the insufficient reaction of the EU to Russia's violation  
51 of Georgian territorial integrity in 2008 and the consequent emboldening of  
52 Russia, and insisting that the EU must learn from this failure by adopting a  
53 credible deterrence and sanctions policy today;

54 6. Noting with concern, the growing influence and destabilising actions of  
55 external actors in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions, including Türkiye's  
56 assertive posture, Iran's deepening ties, and China's expanding economic

57 **footprint;**

58 **7. Having regarded the implementation of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and**  
59 **Enhanced Partnership Agreement since 2019, and welcoming Armenia's historic**  
60 **pivot towards the European Union, demonstrated by: the effective suspension of**  
61 **its CSTO membership; active participation in the EU civilian mission; the launch**  
62 **of visa liberalisation dialogues; and the adoption of a law on initiating EU**  
63 **accession in early 2025, while noting that Armenia intends to maintain its**  
64 **economic ties with the Eurasian Economic Union;**

65 **8. Condemning the ethnic cleansing of the entire Armenian population of Nagorno**  
66 **Karabakh by Azerbaijan following Azerbaijan's September 2023 military offensive,**  
67 **and deeply concerned by the lack of provisions for the right of return in the**  
68 **peace agreement concluded in 2025 and ongoing threats to Armenian cultural and**  
69 **religious heritage;**

70 **9. Deeply concerned that following decoupling from Russia, the EU has become**  
71 **increasingly dependent on other non-democratic regimes like Azerbaijan for**  
72 **energy, without imposing meaningful human rights conditionality, thereby**  
73 **undermining the EU's credibility as a normative power;**

74 **10. Deeply concerned about Belarus's complete subordination to Russia since the**  
75 **fraudulent 2020 elections, including: the permanent stationing of Russian**  
76 **tactical nuclear weapons; the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries; the**  
77 **integration of Belarusian territory into Russia's military planning; the**  
78 **regime's complicity in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children; and the**  
79 **weaponisation of migration as a hybrid warfare tool, and strongly condemning the**  
80 **continued brutal response of the authorities against the opposition, now largely**  
81 **in exile, in prison, or silenced;**

82 **11. Applauding the progress made by Ukraine and Moldova towards EU membership,**  
83 **welcoming the opening of accession negotiations with both countries and the**  
84 **completion of bilateral screening, and noting that the European Commission**  
85 **assessed in late 2025 that both countries are ready to open thematic clusters**  
86 **including the fundamental cluster on justice and human rights;**

87 **12. Condemning the actions of the illegitimate Georgian government led by**  
88 **Georgian Dream including the deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions,**  
89 **including: the adoption of the Russian-style "foreign agents" law; brutal**  
90 **crackdowns on peaceful protesters; anti-LGBTQI+ legislation; and the reversal of**  
91 **democratic reforms, while expressing continued solidarity with the Georgian**  
92 **people's unwavering European aspirations and resistance against the illegitimate**

93 regime;

94 13. Also deeply concerned about the significant challenges faced by the EaP  
95 countries in ensuring an adequate level of human rights standards, as well as  
96 the state of democracy and the rule of law;

97 14. Reiterating the importance of freedom of the media, freedom of expression  
98 and the activities of non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders,  
99 especially represented in youth organisations, in shaping public opinion based  
100 on factual information free from foreign interference, hybrid threats and  
101 disinformation;

102 15. Recalling the essential contribution of civil society organisations, such as  
103 the members of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, regarding the  
104 quality of democracy and their important involvement in the dialogue between the  
105 European institutions and the EaP countries;

106 16. Acknowledging that the 'Beyond 2020' framework on the Eastern Partnership  
107 has become obsolete given the fundamentally different relationships the EU now  
108 maintains with accession candidates, authoritarian regimes, and countries under  
109 Russian occupation;

110 17. Reminding that the campaign "Democracy under Pressure", which aims to raise  
111 awareness of democratic backsliding, human rights abuses, and challenges to the  
112 rule of law, initially in Belarus, is one of JEF's oldest campaigns, and has  
113 expanded in relevance to encompass democratic collapse in Georgia, authoritarian  
114 consolidation in Azerbaijan, and the ongoing struggle for democracy across the  
115 region;

116 18. Noting the launch of the EU's Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea and  
117 the strategic approach to the Black Sea region adopted in 2025, which  
118 establishes three pillars: enhancing security and resilience, fostering  
119 sustainable growth, and promoting environmental protection;

120 19. Recognising the importance of climate diplomacy and green transition  
121 cooperation with Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine,  
122 Moldova, and Georgia, as part of the EU's strategic interest in building  
123 resilient and sustainable societies;

124 JEF Europe therefore,

125 **1. Reiterates the EU's commitment to strengthening multilateralism and recalls**  
126 **the importance of developing a common European foreign policy as the only way to**  
127 **pursue peace and international justice;**

128 **2. Demands the introduction of qualified majority voting in particular in**  
129 **foreign policy decisions concerning the Eastern neighbourhood, ending the**  
130 **paralysis caused by individual Member States, who entertain close diplomatic and**  
131 **economic ties with the Russian Federation, blocking sanctions, enlargement**  
132 **steps, or crisis responses;**

133 **3. Insists that the most important area on which the EU's Eastern policy should**  
134 **be focused is the advancement of respect for human rights, the rule of law, and**  
135 **the achievement of a higher standard of democracy, while recognising that the**  
136 **needs differ fundamentally between accession countries, where conditionality**  
137 **applies, countries suffering from armed aggression and authoritarian regimes,**  
138 **where support must flow exclusively to civil society and independent media;**

139 **4. Encourages the EU institutions to further intensify their cooperation with**  
140 **the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in**  
141 **Europe in monitoring and implementing strategies and practices aimed at**  
142 **improving the level of democracy, the rule of law, and achieving the expression**  
143 **of political and civil rights for all citizens;**

144 **5. Mandates the EU to maintain and significantly expand sanctions on Belarus**  
145 **indefinitely, targeting sectors enabling Russian military integration, the**  
146 **forced deportation of Ukrainian children, and the regime's hybrid warfare**  
147 **operations, including migration manipulation, and to maintain these sanctions**  
148 **until free and fair elections are held and all political prisoners are released;**  
149

150 **6. Requires the EU to significantly increase and simplify funding for local**  
151 **independent civil society, human rights defenders, independent universities,**  
152 **research centres, independent media, and democratic movements across the Eastern**  
153 **neighbourhood, with particular attention to organisations operating under**  
154 **authoritarian regimes where access is restricted and risks are high;**

155 **7. Demands that the EU massively scale up support for independent media, fact-**  
156 **checking organisations, and media literacy programmes as a direct counter to**  
157 **Russian disinformation campaigns and state propaganda;**

158 **8. Insists that the EU actively support EaP countries in safeguarding their**  
159 **rights under international law, including territorial integrity, and champion**

160 **accountability**

161 **mechanisms for crimes of aggression, war crimes, and human rights violations**  
162 **committed in the region, through support for international tribunals and**  
163 **prosecution mechanisms;**

164 **9. Demands that the EU take a leading role in conflict resolution and peace-**  
165 **building across the region, including through expanded civilian monitoring**  
166 **missions such as EUMA in Armenia, active participation in existing negotiation**  
167 **formats, and targeted sanctions against spoilers;**

168 **10. Insists that any peace agreements addressing regional conflicts include**  
169 **explicit provisions for the right of return of displaced populations and**  
170 **protection of cultural and religious heritage;**

171 **11. Demands that energy cooperation with Azerbaijan be conditioned on meaningful**  
172 **human rights compliance, with suspension mechanisms for continued violations,**  
173 **including review of the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,**  
174 **imposing targeted sanctions on those responsible for arbitrary detention, and**  
175 **freezing expanded energy cooperation until tangible human rights progress is**  
176 **made;**

177 **12. Calls on the EU to articulate a clear and differentiated long-term strategy**  
178 **for the Eastern neighbourhood, offering credible EU membership to willing and**  
179 **reform-minded countries, deepening security and defence cooperation to counter**  
180 **Russian aggression, supporting the resilience of societies under authoritarian**  
181 **rule, and keeping the door open to all Eastern partners that demonstrate genuine**  
182 **commitment to European values and reforms;**

183 **13. Demands that the EU pursue a merit-based but politically ambitious**  
184 **enlargement agenda that:**

185 **● maintains momentum in accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova,**  
186 **supporting the opening of the fundamental cluster on justice and human rights; ●**  
187 **offers a credible European perspective to Georgia, conditional on a fundamental**  
188 **reversal of anti-democratic legislation;**

189 **● explores deepened political association with Armenia should it continue its**  
190 **European orientation, while acknowledging its complex economic ties; ● keeps the**  
191 **door open to other Eastern partners that demonstrate genuine commitment to**  
192 **European values;**

193 **14. Insists on the full implementation of Association Agreements and Deep and**  
194 **Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and reform-minded countries, and**  
195 **calls for their gradual extension to cover sectoral integration in energy,**  
196 **digital markets, transport, and green transition, as a pathway to closer**  
197 **economic alignment with the EU single market;**

198 **15. Supports deeper sectoral integration between the EU and willing Eastern**  
199 **partners, including:**

200 **● transport connectivity through extension of TEN-T networks;**

201 **● digital integration through roaming agreements and harmonisation of digital**  
202 **markets;**

203 **● energy cooperation through synchronisation of grids and renewable energy**  
204 **partnerships;**

205 **● green transition through access to EU climate financing;**

206 **16. Insists on the role that the EU, in cooperation with civil society**  
207 **organisations, must play in promoting civil and political rights, in ensuring**  
208 **the protection of ethnic and religious minorities including Armenians remaining**  
209 **in Azerbaijan and national minorities in Georgia, and in defending the civil**  
210 **rights of the most discriminated and harassed members of society, including**  
211 **those in the LGBTQI+ community who face increasing state-sponsored persecution**  
212 **in several EaP countries;**

213 **17. Requires a major expansion of EU youth programmes in the Eastern**  
214 **neighbourhood, including Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and dedicated**  
215 **youth mobility schemes, with simplified visa procedures and increased funding to**  
216 **ensure that young people in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia (including**  
217 **refugees and vulnerable groups) have meaningful opportunities for education,**  
218 **training, and exchange within the EU;**

219 **18. Calls on the EU to grant observer status in the European Committee of the**  
220 **Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee to Ukraine and Moldova,**  
221 **and to maintain such status for Georgia only if democratic progress resumes;**

222 **19. Mandates full implementation of the EU's Common Maritime Agenda for the**  
223 **Black Sea, with adequate funding for military mobility infrastructure, a**  
224 **maritime security monitoring hub, and connectivity corridors;**

225 **20. Urges the EU to finalise a legal framework for the confiscation of frozen**  
226 **Russian state assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine, extending this principle**  
227 **to Belarusian regime assets.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** PC3 (decided on: 03/30/2026)

**Title:** Patching the holes in the EU fabric: a federal Switzerland in a federal Europe

## Motion text

1 11 November 2023 (lapsing). Renewed for Federal Committee April 2026 Submitted  
2 by Political Commission 3: External Affairs & Global Governance

3 JEF Europe,

4 ● Applauding the federalist, multicultural and multilingual democratic system of  
5 Switzerland;

6 ● Welcoming the successful conclusion of negotiations on the Bilaterals III  
7 package, signed on 2 March 2026 in Brussels by President Guy Parmelin and the  
8 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen;

9 ● Recognising the present absence of popular support to join the EU but noting a  
10 clear desire to increase collaboration and recognising increased political  
11 willingness on both sides to stabilise and deepen relations, as demonstrated by  
12 the Bilaterals III package, which includes participation in key EU programmes;

13 ● Deploring the lack of democratic debates before the Swiss government broke off  
14 negotiations in May 2021, which created mistrust between the EU and its Swiss  
15 partner;

16 ● Welcoming the signature of the EU Programmes Agreement (EUPA) on 10 November  
17 2025, granting Switzerland association to Horizon Europe, Euratom, and Digital  
18 Europe retroactively from 1 January 2025, with participation in ITER from 2026,

19 EU4Health (subject to the health agreement), and Erasmus+ from 2027;

20 ● Regretting the slow unravelling of bilateral agreements due to the lack of  
21 progress in their update which led, among other things, to the loss of the stock  
22 exchange equivalency, and non-renewal of the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA)  
23 provisions on medical devices (aka MedTech), impacting Swiss companies and  
24 customers with rising prices and/or less choice of products and services, and  
25 acknowledging that the Bilaterals III package addresses these issues through  
26 updated agreements on air transport, land transport, free movement of persons,  
27 conformity assessment, and agricultural products, complemented by new agreements  
28 on food safety, health, and electricity;

29 ● Acknowledging the Swiss semi-direct democracy system which has worked well for  
30 Switzerland, and noting that, when Switzerland becomes an EU member, Swiss  
31 referenda would become an integral part of the EU decision-making process in all  
32 domains where Swiss parliamentary authorities are engaged, exclusively or  
33 jointly as part of EU decision-making, but not when competencies are exclusive  
34 to the EU, in line with the Swiss federalist logic between municipalities,  
35 cantons, and the Confederation;

36 ● Acknowledging the recommendations issued by the Council of Europe's Group of  
37 States against Corruption (GRECO) to Switzerland regarding political funding for  
38 elections, referenda and initiatives;

39 ● Deploing the structural democratic deficit inherent in the bilateral model,  
40 whereby Swiss lawmakers incorporate EU law into Swiss law without having formal  
41 representation in EU decision-making institutions, a gap that can only be fully  
42 addressed through Swiss EU membership or through new institutional arrangements  
43 that have not yet been developed on either side;

44 ● Highlighting the importance of the continuation of cross-border cooperation  
45 between Switzerland and its neighbours at the local and regional level,  
46 including but not limited to key areas such as public transport, scientific  
47 research, education, healthcare, environmental conservation, and economic  
48 development;

49 ● Recognising the prevalence of cross-border workers in the Swiss labour force,  
50 constituting a significant proportion, who engage in commuting activities from  
51 neighbouring countries, thereby rendering them notably susceptible to challenges  
52 associated with cross-border work-related impediments;

53 ● Mindful of fears over maintaining high wage levels in Switzerland in the face

54 of EU integration, but aware that the cases of Denmark, Luxembourg and others  
55 have shown that maintaining high wages is compatible with EU membership;

56 ● Concerned that EU law may be applied differently in Switzerland and that there  
57 may be a lack of an efficient dispute resolution mechanism between Switzerland  
58 and the EU; an issue addressed in the Bilaterals III package through provisions  
59 for dynamic alignment of legislation and a dispute-settlement mechanism;

60 ● Noting that the safeguard clause on free movement of persons has been  
61 modified: Switzerland can maintain the clause but can no longer activate it  
62 unilaterally without prior discussion with the EU;

63 ● Welcoming Switzerland's participation in most EU sanctions packages, and  
64 noting that the Swiss parliament has approved amendments to the War Materiel Act  
65 allowing automatic re-export of weapons to 25 countries that share Swiss values  
66 and have comparable export control regimes, subject to a possible referendum and  
67 with the government retaining the right to block individual exports on national  
68 security grounds, while regretting that this change is not retroactive and  
69 therefore does not affect Swiss made weaponry bought by EU states prior to its  
70 entry into force, and noting with concern that Ukraine is not included among the  
71 benefiting countries;

72 ● Respecting Swiss military neutrality, but also reminding Switzerland that it  
73 benefits disproportionately from the EU's security and defence mechanisms  
74 without contributing, and that there will be growing expectations from the EU  
75 and its Member

76 States for Switzerland to contribute to Europe's future security and defence  
77 architecture and to level the playing field in security and defence spending;

78 ● Calling on the EU to remain responsive to Switzerland's security concerns and  
79 to engage in genuine partnership, recognising that a stable and mutually  
80 beneficial relationship requires efforts from both sides;

81 ● Welcoming Switzerland's commitment under Bilaterals III to a permanent  
82 financial contribution to EU cohesion: CHF 130 million annually for 2025-2029,  
83 increasing to CHF 350 million annually for 2030-2036;

84 ● Noting the establishment of a high-level dialogue between Switzerland and the  
85 EU through a joint declaration, providing for annual meetings to review progress  
86 and discuss future cooperation;

87 ● Welcoming the new agreements on electricity, food safety, health, and  
88 Switzerland's participation in the EU Agency for the Space Programme (Galileo  
89 and EGNOS), which deepen sectoral integration beyond the internal market;

90 ● Welcoming progress toward an EU–Switzerland electricity agreement, recognising  
91 Switzerland's strategic importance in European energy security and the shared  
92 goal of a carbon-neutral continent;

93 JEF Europe therefore,

94 1. Encourages Switzerland to pursue the process of European integration and to  
95 ensure the successful ratification of the Bilaterals III package through its  
96 parliamentary and popular consultation processes;

97 2. Suggests that Switzerland join Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway in the EEA  
98 in the short term as a possible first step toward EU membership, while  
99 acknowledging that the Bilaterals III package already provides access to key EEA  
100 programmes including Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, Digital Europe, and Euratom;

101 3. Urges Switzerland to join the EU in order to fill the current democratic gap  
102 and enjoy the benefits of EU membership;

103 4. Calls on Switzerland and the EU to conclude as soon as possible a  
104 comprehensive package settling essential institutional issues such as dynamic  
105 incorporation of evolving EU legislation and an efficient dispute-settlement  
106 mechanism; welcoming that the Bilaterals III package, signed on 2 March 2026,  
107 achieves these objectives;

108 5. Calls on the EU and Switzerland to conclude an energy agreement as part of a  
109 comprehensive package; welcoming that such an agreement on electricity is  
110 included in Bilaterals III;

111 6. Invites Switzerland to modernize its interpretation of neutrality and align  
112 fully with the foreign policy of the EU in particular as regards sanctions and  
113 sanction enforcement against Russia in response to the full-scale invasion of  
114 Ukraine, welcomes the Swiss

115 parliament's approval of amendments to the War Materiel Act easing weapons re  
116 export restrictions to 25 countries sharing Swiss values, while regretting that  
117 Ukraine is not included and that the changes are not retroactive;

- 118 **7. Recommends that special attention be given to potential issues arising from**  
119 **Switzerland's high wage and price levels by replacing current "accompanying**  
120 **measures" by EU and / or Swiss legislative measures designed to protect local**  
121 **wages;**
- 122 **8. Commits itself to support a referendum or a citizen initiative in Switzerland**  
123 **aiming at closer integration of Switzerland with the EU;**
- 124 **9. Urges Switzerland to become a participating country of the Erasmus+**  
125 **programme, welcoming that participation is confirmed from 2027 under Bilaterals**  
126 **III;**
- 127 **10. Strongly calls for full and permanent re-association of Switzerland to EU**  
128 **research programmes and Erasmus+ beyond the current Bilaterals III timeline,**  
129 **ensuring long-term stability for Swiss and European students, researchers, and**  
130 **innovators;**
- 131 **11. Commits itself to support JEF Switzerland in its objectives of improving the**  
132 **relationship between Switzerland and the EU and to support Switzerland in**  
133 **becoming a full member of a federal European Union.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** TF Empowerment & Diversity (decided on: 03/28/2026)

**Title:** JEF Europe Code of Conduct

## Motion text

1 The Code of Conduct (CoC) outlined in this section provides a broad and non-  
2 exhaustive framework for understanding what behaviour is not permissible at  
3 events and forums organised by Young European Federalists (JEF), including  
4 online spaces and communication channels affiliated with the organisation.

5 JEF Europe is committed to maintaining and further developing a culture based on  
6 mutual respect, human dignity, safety, and equality as preconditions to ensure  
7 full access and active participation, reflecting the right to an empowering  
8 space for safe and inclusive participation in its activities.

9 The aim of this Code of Conduct is to ensure that every individual feels safe,  
10 heard, included, and respected in JEF Europe; that every individual has the  
11 means to actively participate in JEF; and that JEF as an organization  
12 continuously strives for further inclusiveness, diversity, and safety in all its  
13 activities.

14 The Code outlines the social and ethical responsibilities of individuals and  
15 groups, and binds JEF Europe to implement the Code. The Code comprises a set of  
16 substantive and procedural rules, such as the use of contact persons, to ensure  
17 safe participation and an empowering space, inclusion, equity, and respect of  
18 all individuals involved with JEF activities.

19 This Code of Conduct is subdivided into following 12 sections:

20 **1. Acting in accordance with the Code of Conduct**

21 **2. Consent**

22 **3. Assumptions**

23 **4. Power Relations**

24 **5. Relations with the Secretariat**

25 **6. Obligations**

26 **7. Application**

27 **8. Reporting**

28 **9. Enforcement**

29 **10. Legal steps**

30 **11. Privacy**

31 **The following sections provide additional details pertaining to the reporting of**  
32 **breaches of the CoC, the interpretation of the CoC, and the measures that are**  
33 **available for enforcing the CoC.**

34 **As a condition of acceptance in events organised by JEF, participants and**  
35 **organisers agree to familiarise themselves with the CoC and, to the best of**  
36 **their ability, to adhere to the following terms:**

37 **1. Acting in accordance with the Code of Conduct**

38 **The following rules shall be interpreted broadly to include any conduct**  
39 **considered inappropriate and inconsistent with the ideals of JEF Europe as**  
40 **expressed in the Statutes. Any breach of these rules shall lead to action as**  
41 **defined in the procedures in section 10.**

42 **Participants in JEF activities commit to adopt and promote appropriate behavior**  
43 **including but not limited to:**

44 **1. Respecting others and not using language or behaviour that is intended to**

- 45            **denigrate or undermine their contributions;**
- 46            **2. Not discriminating on the basis of any personal or physical**  
47            **characteristics, including gender, appearance, nationality, style or any**  
48            **other features;**
- 49            **3. Ensuring that others are given the opportunity to speak and be heard**  
50            **without interruption;**
- 51            **4. Forming an environment where everyone feels comfortable expressing their**  
52            **opinions, even if those opinions are in a minority, provided they are**  
53            **expressed in adherence to the other terms;**
- 54            **5. Discussing sensitive topics in a considerate manner, being mindful that**  
55            **others may be personally affected by them;**
- 56            **6. Understanding the importance of lived experience, not dismissing or**  
57            **seeking to explain the basic terms of issues or conflicts that others have**  
58            **been personally affected by;**
- 59            **7. Supporting the inclusion of others who may be less familiar with the**  
60            **issues being discussed in a way that does not put into question their**  
61            **intelligence or capability to understand them;**
- 62            **8. Refraining from commenting on someone's appearance in ways that may make**  
63            **them feel uncomfortable or objectified;**
- 64            **9. Avoiding the use of language which treats a certain level of mental or**  
65            **physical health or bodily ability or a lack of as being normal or more**  
66            **desirable;**
- 67            **10. Showing an appreciation and a consideration for other people's cultural or**

68 religious practices and beliefs, including understanding that what is  
69 acceptable in one's own culture or religion may not be in others;

70 11. Appeals to cultural norms shall not justify behavior that constitutes  
71 discrimination, harassment, or abuse as defined in this Code;

72 12. Not feeding racist, gender or other stereotypes in their speech, actions,  
73 or behaviour, even as a joke or ironically;

74 13. Refraining from physical contact beyond basic greetings without consent  
75 and showing respect for the personal space of others;

76 14. Not peer pressuring others into partaking in voluntary activities;

77 15. Not bullying others for perceived mistakes or differences, defined as  
78 anything that is intended to draw laughter at their expense;

79 16. Not engage in any form of harassment, abuse, intimidation, or hostile  
80 behaviour towards fellow JEFers and participants in JEF activities.

## 81 2. Consent

82 All parties involved need to be familiar with the concept of consent and what  
83 constitutes sexual and emotional harassment.

84 Consent is defined for the purposes of this document as an agreement between two  
85 or more people to engage in activities together, While particularly relevant in  
86 the context of sexual interactions, the concept of consent also serves as a  
87 general guideline for respectful interpersonal behaviour.

88 Consent is not always given or refused through verbal or written approval and  
89 those requesting it need to take into account non-verbal or written forms of  
90 approval such as tone or body language.

91 **If there is any doubt that you have been given consent, then the activity should**  
92 **be stopped. Consent can be withdrawn and if this occurs, any failure to stop the**  
93 **activity will be treated as harassment or abuse.**

94 **Consent cannot be given by someone who is significantly impaired by alcohol or**  
95 **other substances and as a result, they are not fully conscious, awake or capable**  
96 **of making informed decisions.**

97 **If someone agrees to an activity because of pressure or the threat of bullying,**  
98 **even if it is implicit, then this does not constitute consent.**

99 **Consent should be defined in an easy-to-understand way according to the**  
100 **definition provided in the document at the beginning.**

### 101 **3. Assumptions**

102 **As an inclusive and empowering space for young people from many backgrounds, JEF**  
103 **is committed to the pursuit of a free and united Europe.**

104 **Understanding that prejudices and unconscious biases can be ingrained in us, it**  
105 **is the responsibility of each individual involved in an event to actively avoid**  
106 **making assumptions, including but not limited to:**

107 **1. A person's background or opinions based on their skin colour, other**  
108 **external features, or their accent and vocabulary;**

109 **2. A person's country of origin, whether this be its political status,**  
110 **economic status, or any other elements of their culture;**

111 **3. A person's religious or political affiliation, and what this means for**  
112 **their opinions, convictions, and beliefs on a range of issues;**

113 **4. A person's gender or sexual identity, noting that neither are binary nor**  
114 **are people required to place themselves on a spectrum upon request;**

115 **5. A person's ability to do the same things as someone else, especially in**  
116 **the case of hidden disabilities;**

117 6. A person's good health or otherwise.

118 While making assumptions is not necessarily against the CoC on the basis that  
119 people can make the wrong judgements on the appropriate comments in a particular  
120 context and that this does not require intervention, failure to apologise if  
121 prompted would constitute a potential breach of 1A.

#### 122 4. Power Relations

123 Members of any of the JEF statutory bodies (Executive Board, Federal Committee,  
124 Arbitration Board, Auditors Committee), the Secretariat, Permanent Contact  
125 People, and the Pool of Trainers are considered to be in a relative position of  
126 power and therefore in a special and unique position of trust.

127 The words someone in a relative position of power speaks, the actions they take,  
128 and the environment they create can carry more influence and pressure than other  
129 members of the group.

130 Individuals in a relative position of power must take extra care to ensure they  
131 are not unduly influencing or pressuring members of the group, especially with  
132 regard to consent.

133 Ways these individuals may take extra care include self-reflection, deferring to  
134 the organisers and ensuring that they are not seen as having more power than  
135 they have, and being open to feedback.

136 The CoC applies to these individuals in the same way as it would anyone else,  
137 and no claim of a breach of the CoC may be investigated either by themselves or  
138 someone who has a close relationship with them.

#### 139 5. Relations with the Secretariat

140 The office hours of the Secretariat are 09:00 to 18:30 Central European Time.  
141 These need to be respected, with no pressure exerted to work outside of office  
142 hours.

143 The Secretariat should not be contacted on their personal phone number, email  
144 address, or social media accounts for work-related purposes without express  
145 prior agreement.

146 **The relationship between the Secretariat, the other JEF statutory bodies and**  
147 **positions of power, and the national sections, must be founded on mutual trust.**  
148 **If issues cannot be resolved by the Executive Board and the Secretariat, the**  
149 **issue will be elevated to the Permanent Contact People.**

## 150 **6. Obligations**

### 151 **Presenting the Code of Conduct**

- 152 **1. The Code shall be circulated ahead of and in every JEF Europe event and**  
153 **activity where applicable. The Code shall be presented on the first day**  
154 **and when deemed necessary reminders to the code shall be given by the**  
155 **appropriate party;**
- 156 **2. The Code shall be introduced using the Code of Conduct presentation;**
- 157 **3. The presentation of the Code of Conduct shall:**
  - 158 **1. ensure that participants understand its content and obligations;**
  - 159 **2. be appropriate to the purpose of the document;**
  - 160 **3. consider the type and duration of the event;**
  - 161 **4. The Code shall be presented by one of the organisers, facilitators,**  
162 **or the Contact Persons, and the means to report to the Contact**  
163 **Persons shall be presented at the same time;**
  - 164 **5. The Code shall be accessible for reference throughout the event or**  
165 **activity.**

### 166 **Permanent Contact Persons**

- 167 **1. Permanent Contact Persons are dedicated to ensuring safety and feeling of**  
168 **safety across the association and can be contacted online at anytime;**
- 169 **2. At least three (3) Permanent Contact Persons shall be elected by the**  
170 **upcoming Federal Committee and have a two-year mandate;**

- 171 3. The number of Permanent Contact Persons shall be uneven in order to enable  
172 clear decision-making in cases where differing opinions arise, without the  
173 option of abstaining or not voting on the issue if that would impede  
174 making a decision;
- 175 4. The Permanent Contact Persons shall represent different gender identities;
- 176 5. The Permanent Contact Persons shall, to the greatest extent possible,  
177 reflect the diversity of JEF's membership, including different gender  
178 identities and, where possible, different backgrounds with regard to  
179 disability, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and geographical origin, so  
180 that all members can find a Contact Person with relevant lived experience;
- 181 6. The Permanent Contact Persons shall be familiar with the Code of Conduct  
182 and charged to interpret and act in accordance;
- 183 7. In case the Permanent Contact Person is unable to continue in the role or  
184 resigns, a new Permanent Contact person shall be elected by the Federal  
185 Committee for the remainder of the term.

186 **Contact Persons**

- 187 1. Contact Persons are dedicated to ensuring safety and sense of safety and  
188 to being available for participants in person and online;
- 189 2. At least two (2) Contact Persons shall be appointed by the organisers for  
190 every event and activity of JEF Europe. For smaller activities with fewer  
191 than ten (10) participants, the appointment of one (1) Contact Person  
192 shall be considered sufficient;
- 193 3. For online meetings of task forces, political commissions, and similar  
194 groups, the chair(s) may act as Contact Persons unless another person is  
195 designated;

- 196 4. The Contact Persons shall be selected so that they are available  
197 throughout the event or activity and they cannot hold a position of  
198 President, Vice President or a Member of FC Presidium;
- 199 5. The organising team of an event where two or more Contact Persons are  
200 appointed, must ensure that Contact Persons represent different gender  
201 identities;
- 202 1. In exceptional cases when people of multiple gender are not directly  
203 available e.g. in the organising team, contact person can be one of  
204 the participants in the event or one of the permanent contact  
205 persons can assist remotely.
- 206 2. Wherever possible, Contact Persons should not be part of the main  
207 organising team of the event in order to ensure independence and  
208 approachability for participants.
- 209 6. The organising team must ensure that Contact Persons represent different  
210 gender identities and, wherever possible, reflect broader dimensions of  
211 diversity relevant to the event's participant profile, including  
212 disability, ethnicity, and LGBTIQ+ experience;
- 213 7. The Contact Persons shall be trained by persons familiar with the Code of  
214 Conduct in interpreting and acting in accordance with it, as well as in  
215 facilitating the follow-up of a breach;
- 216 8. The Contact Persons shall be appointed and trained ahead of the event or  
217 activity in question;
- 218 9. If you do not feel comfortable reporting to the Contact Person, if you do  
219 not feel your rights have been ensured, or if you have any complaints,  
220 please contact one of the Permanent Contact Persons;
- 221 10. When multiple organisations are collaborating in organisation of an event  
222 or other activity covered by this Code, the Contact Persons should  
223 represent multiple organising parties.

224 **Code of Conduct form**

- 225 1. A specific form is made for each individual event or activity and is only  
226 accessible by the Contact Persons and shall be actively monitored during  
227 the intended event or activity and for four (4) weeks after the end of the  
228 event or activity by the Contact Persons;
- 229 2. The form shall provide the possibility to state what happened and what  
230 they wish that the next steps are;
- 231 3. The form shall have the possibility to provide one's contact details or  
232 opt for anonymity;
- 233 4. There shall be a permanent form available on JEF website through which the  
234 Permanent Contact Persons can be contacted anonymously.

235 **7. Application**

236 This section outlines the scope of application of the Code of Conduct, including  
237 to whom it applies and in which contexts, settings, and circumstances it is to  
238 be observed.

239 [To whom this Code of Conduct apply:](#)

240 As outlined in the Introduction chapter and chapter on power relations , the CoC  
241 applies to all JEF events and those in a position of power.

242 The CoC does not apply to events of national sections and other affiliated  
243 organisations of JEF, unless the European bodies are involved as co-organisers,  
244 as enforcement does not fall under the responsibility of the statutory bodies.

245 National sections and other affiliated organisations of JEF are entrusted to  
246 comply with their legal responsibilities in all events and if this is in any  
247 question then appropriate measures will be taken, including the recommendation  
248 of disaffiliation pending a vote.

249 JEF Europe encourages national sections and affiliated organisations to adopt

250 and enforce their own Codes of Conduct or comparable safeguarding policies  
251 adapted to their national context. In cases where such a document does not  
252 exist, this Code of Conduct may be used as a guiding framework for ensuring  
253 safe, respectful, and inclusive participation in their activities until a  
254 dedicated document is developed and adopted at the national level.

255 When registering for or participating in a JEF event, each participant accepts  
256 and commits to these rules by default.

257 JEF Europe requires that the behaviour of an individual participating in any  
258 offline or online activity of JEF Europe, or representing JEF Europe in external  
259 events, meetings, public communication, or online spaces, must be consistent  
260 with and follow these rules.

261 Participants in JEF activities are encouraged to report any potential violations  
262 of the Code of Conduct. At the beginning of each event, organisers must clearly  
263 explain the reporting procedures and ensure that any reported concerns are  
264 reviewed according to the established process.

265 As a participant in JEF Europe activities, you are expected to understand and  
266 follow the Code, as well as your obligations under the law applicable wherever  
267 you are. JEF Europe recognises that its network is conducting activities that  
268 also involve the participation of minors on occasion. The Protection Guidelines  
269 for Minors of JEF Europe<sup>1</sup> detail the additional safeguarding measures to be  
270 applied in case of the participation of minors.

271 The organisers of an event have a duty of care for anyone who is involved in a  
272 potential violation of the CoC and must follow the accordant safeguarding  
273 procedures.

274 As JEF events may occasionally include participants who are legally considered  
275 minors (defined for the purposes of JEF as individuals under 18 years of age),  
276 organisers have additional safeguarding responsibilities.

277 If you are ever in doubt about how to follow the rules set in the Code of  
278 Conduct, you are encouraged to ask for guidance from any of the Contact Persons  
279 (as defined in Section 11).

280 **1** The Protection Guidelines for Minors of JEF Europe, 2023, available on the  
281 internal area of JEF Europe website,  
282 [https://drive.google.com/file/d/19AvgewbUmsfGPuN7ziWy-](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19AvgewbUmsfGPuN7ziWy-M8KE1xqCGRd/view?usp=sharing)  
283 [M8KE1xqCGRd/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19AvgewbUmsfGPuN7ziWy-M8KE1xqCGRd/view?usp=sharing)

284 **Where and when this Code applies:**

285 **The Code of Conduct applies during both online and offline activities of JEF**  
286 **Europe, in both formal and informal settings. The Code also applies between JEF**  
287 **Europe events, including in all communication channels affiliated with JEF**  
288 **Europe, such as messaging platforms, social media, email communication, and**  
289 **other digital spaces used by the organisation, as well as in communications with**  
290 **the staff of the JEF Europe Secretariat.**

291 **This Code may apply or act as a guide, at the discretion of the organisers,**  
292 **within events hosted by more than one JEF section where no similar document has**  
293 **been adopted. When collaborating with other organisations with their Codes of**  
294 **Conduct or comparable documents, the organising parties will decide which**  
295 **document shall apply but the JEF party involved needs to ensure that the minimum**  
296 **standards set in this document are a reality also in the given collaboration.**

297 **A formal setting shall be understood as including any part of the working**  
298 **programme of an event, Task Force or Political Commission meetings, and**  
299 **statutory bodies' meetings.**

300 **Informal settings shall be understood as including any activities happening in**  
301 **connection to a formal meeting or any other JEF Europe event, including social**  
302 **media interactions directly related to JEF Europe activities, or other informal**  
303 **get-together clearly linked to JEF Europe activities. Activities surrounding the**  
304 **working programme, including, but not limited to, social events and online**  
305 **communication, shall be considered as informal settings.**

## 306 **8. Reporting**

307 **The Code of Conduct applies to every member of JEF Europe and every participant**  
308 **in a JEF activity, regardless of their role in the organisation. If you observe**  
309 **or experience behaviour that concerns you, or that may represent a violation of**  
310 **our Code, please raise the issue with one of the Contact Persons promptly,**  
311 **provided you feel comfortable doing so. You may choose to report anonymously or**  
312 **be accompanied by a person you trust when making a report. This will allow JEF**  
313 **Europe an opportunity to deal with the issue and correct it, ideally before it**  
314 **becomes a violation of law or a risk to health or security.**

315 **Situations can be reported to the event Contact Persons up to four weeks after**  
316 **the event, and the anonymous form will remain open for the same period. The**  
317 **Permanent Contact Persons may be contacted at any time, with no fixed deadline,**  
318 **and their route is fully equivalent to the event-specific route.**

319 **Inappropriate or unwanted behaviour or action can be reported through:**

- 320 **1. One or more of the Contact Persons presented at the beginning of the**  
321 **activity, in person or online;**
- 322 **2. A Code of conduct form that can be used to report anonymously;**
- 323 **3. Other means mentioned in the beginning of the event or activity.**

324 **JEF Europe is committed to ensuring that reporting processes are accessible to**  
325 **all participants, including those with disabilities. Where necessary, reasonable**  
326 **accommodations should be provided to ensure equal access to the reporting**  
327 **process. Reports may be made verbally (in person or by call) as well as in**  
328 **writing. The reporting form shall be available in plain language and, where**  
329 **possible, easy-read format. A support person of the reporter's choosing may**  
330 **accompany them throughout any reporting or follow-up process.**

## 331 **9. Enforcement**

332 **In case of any breach from the Code of Conduct, the dedicated contact persons at**  
333 **the event or activity are required to, on their best judgement and with the**  
334 **consent of the person affected by the conduct, in proportionate and progressive**  
335 **measures and depending on the severity of the action:**

- 336 **1. Remind participants of their obligation to act in accordance with the**  
337 **present Code of Conduct and give them advice on how to do so;**
- 338 **2. Engage in a one to one conversation with the person in breach of the Code**  
339 **to make sure that there is a mutual understanding of the nature of the**  
340 **inappropriate action, including clarifying and explaining possible**  
341 **misunderstandings and intercultural differences;**
- 342 **3. Inform, only when necessary, the other organisers of the event or the**  
343 **meeting chairs about the problematic behaviour or the violation of the**  
344 **Code;**

- 345 4. Facilitate a structured conversation between parties to resolve the  
346 situation, should the affected party in the situation consent to such  
347 conversation;
- 348 5. In consultation with the organising team and the facilitators of the  
349 activity, suspend the session and/or ban the person in breach of the Code  
350 from attending the remainder of the event or activity;
- 351 6. In consultation with the organising team and the facilitators of the  
352 activity and the Arbitration Board, the Executive Board may impose  
353 sanctions up to and including restrict or ban participation temporarily or  
354 permanently in future JEF Europe activities.

355 In the case of violent or other potentially illegal behaviour, contact the  
356 police in consultation with the person affected in accordance with the national  
357 law.

358 The Executive Board in consultation with organisers and contact persons of the  
359 event may decide to suspend or permanently ban the person in breach of the Code  
360 from future attending JEF events or activities. The decision shall be taken  
361 within a month after the report is received.

362 In situations where the person reporting is known, they should be communicated  
363 with as soon as practical about reception of their report. In any case, the  
364 action agreed on by the contact persons and the person reporting should be taken  
365 as soon as possible and when possible, during the event. The case is closed when  
366 all of the agreed on steps have been taken to resolve the situation and all the  
367 parties involved in the report have been made aware of the steps taken and of  
368 the closure. When applicable and the reporting person is known, the Contact  
369 Persons may encourage them to seek professional advice or help.

370 If a report leads to a formal follow-up or investigation, the person whose  
371 behaviour is being examined shall be informed of the concern raised and the  
372 nature of the alleged breach of the Code of Conduct. This communication shall  
373 take place as soon as reasonably possible, while ensuring that the identity of  
374 the reporting person remains confidential if anonymity has been requested. All  
375 parties involved shall be treated fairly and respectfully throughout the  
376 process.

377 **10. Legal steps**

378 **This Code applies to all participants, organisers, trainers, elected**  
379 **representatives, staff members, and any other individuals involved in JEF Europe**  
380 **activities.**

381 **They are expected to comply with the Code of Conduct as well as all applicable**  
382 **laws, rules and regulations. In a case where the provision of the Code of**  
383 **Conduct should conflict with applicable law, the law prevails.**

384 **In cases where behaviour may constitute a criminal offence under applicable**  
385 **national law, including but not limited to physical violence, threats,**  
386 **harassment, or discrimination prohibited by law, the Contact Persons, in**  
387 **consultation with the person affected whenever possible, may contact the**  
388 **relevant law enforcement authorities where required or appropriate under**  
389 **national legislation.**

390 **Such measures do not limit or interfere with the right of the affected person or**  
391 **group to independently pursue legal action or seek protection through the**  
392 **appropriate legal channels.**

393 **11. Privacy**

394 **To protect the privacy of all parties concerned, the Contact Persons and other**  
395 **persons involved in the process are bound to confidentiality and discretion**  
396 **regarding any information they become aware of during the reporting process,**  
397 **except if any legal procedure requires it or for the safety of the individual.**

398 **The Contact Persons and other persons involved in the process shall not disclose**  
399 **the identities of the parties concerned without their prior consent.**

400 **The Permanent Contact Persons shall develop and maintain an internal guidance**  
401 **document for Contact Persons. This document shall contain anonymised**  
402 **descriptions of cases and practical guidance on how different situations have**  
403 **been handled in the past. All information included in this guide must be fully**  
404 **anonymised and written in a way that prevents any case from being traced back to**  
405 **specific individuals, events, or locations. The purpose of this document is to**  
406 **support future Contact Persons in responding appropriately to potential breaches**  
407 **of the Code of Conduct while preserving the privacy and confidentiality of all**  
408 **parties involved.**

409 **In the cases where the Executive Board may decide to ban or suspend someone from**  
410 **attending further JEF events, the decision may be reflected in the minutes of**  
411 **that meeting in a way so as to guarantee the anonymity of the persons involved**  
412 **in that Code of Conduct breach.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** TF Empowerment & Diversity (decided on: 03/28/2026)

**Title:** Towards a more inclusive, diverse and empowered JEF

## Motion text

- 1 ● Recognising that Europe has become a more diverse society, yet decision-making  
2 in civil society organisations, political parties, and NGOs continues to reflect  
3 structural inequalities that systematically underrepresent racialised people,  
4 people with disabilities, LGBTIQ+ people, women, and those from lower  
5 socioeconomic or migrant backgrounds;
- 6 ● Acknowledging that societal power structures affect people's possibilities to  
7 participate and be themselves in society, e.g., due to their age, gender, gender  
8 expression, religious conviction, or other belief, ethnic or cultural  
9 background, migration status, nationality, refugee or minority status,  
10 educational background, socio-economic background, ability or any other personal  
11 attribute;
- 12 ● Recognising that individuals may face overlapping forms of discrimination and  
13 exclusion due to the intersection of identities such as gender, ethnicity,  
14 disability, socio-economic background, sexual orientation or migration status;
- 15 ● Acknowledging that currently at this stage, JEFers are not fully  
16 representative of all Europeans and people living on the continent, including  
17 people with different abilities, educational and socio-economic backgrounds, and  
18 we still lack accessible representation of racialised people, people with a  
19 migration or refugee background, from different minorities, whether in  
20 membership, in elected positions or the Secretariat;

- 21 ● Being aware that JEF Europe and its national sections face, like many other  
22 non-governmental organisations and youth political organisations, the challenges  
23 of the gender gap, in particular online, and therefore strives to empower women  
24 and gender minorities to take higher positions in the different levels of JEF;
- 25 ● Recalling the progress on improved inclusion through the introduction and  
26 subsequent development of the JEF Code of Conduct as well as the development of  
27 processes to tackle and prevent harassment, bullying or other forms of indecent  
28 behaviour;
- 29 ● The implementation of Gender Watch has shown variation in participation of  
30 genders in Federal Committee meetings, and the increased representation of women  
31 and non-binary people in elected positions has impacted the results;
- 32 ● Keeping in mind the labour of the Task Force Empowerment and Diversity, which  
33 aims to foster equality and inclusion within the network as well as increase the  
34 participation of young people with fewer opportunities and different backgrounds  
35 in JEF;
- 36 ● Recalling initiatives such as the JEF Solidarity Fund aimed at lowering the  
37 threshold of participation of young people with lesser means and welcoming the  
38 creation of the guidelines for application of the Solidarity Fund, as well as  
39 increasing the maximum amount of the travel cost reimbursement;
- 40 ● Recognising the overall increased societal understanding and recognition of  
41 equal representation of individuals with different backgrounds and identities,  
42 as well as the need for continuous action for ensuring such representation;
- 43 ● Noting the actions taken to improve the safety, accessibility and inclusivity  
44 in the network, including guidelines for minors and protection of activists as  
45 well as the accessible language guide;
- 46 ● Recognising barriers for participation in JEF activities, such as the high  
47 cost of travel to international events and activities;
- 48 ● Being aware of the increased demands and pressure young people face in their  
49 everyday lives, including their activism;
- 50 ● Convinced that continued and further action to improve inclusion is needed.

51 Therefore, JEF Europe:

52 1. Demands that JEF Europe's elected representatives, European secretariat and  
53 JEF sections create an environment within JEF where members feel comfortable to  
54 address questions of empowerment, diversity and inclusion, where people of all  
55 backgrounds and other personal differences feel that their rights are respected.

56 2. Encourages diversity in its membership, which can only be attained through  
57 the active recruitment of JEF members through a multitude of different  
58 environments and institutions, rather than the often standard recruitment  
59 through universities. This membership diversity could be sought from different  
60 educational institutions and secondary level schools, other youth organisations  
61 and minority communities. We also aim to recruit those who are not currently  
62 studying or people already in the workforce. JEF sections should reach out  
63 proactively to the aforementioned institutions for their support. By doing so,  
64 JEF would further gain legitimacy, by ensuring better and wider representation  
65 of the European youth and better reflect their ideas and opinions.

66 3. Commits to applying an intersectional approach to all inclusion and diversity  
67 work, recognising that members may face compounding and mutually reinforcing  
68 forms of marginalisation due to overlapping identities, including but not  
69 limited to disability, gender, race, ethnicity, migration status, sexual  
70 orientation, and socioeconomic background, and ensuring that JEF's inclusion  
71 measures actively reach those facing multiple forms of exclusion simultaneously.

72 4. Recommends sections to introduce measures to increase representation of women  
73 and gender minorities, in particular in leadership positions through quota  
74 systems and complementary tools, and calls on sections that have not yet done so  
75 to adapt their quota systems to explicitly include non-binary people, inviting  
76 the Task Force on Empowerment and Diversity to provide model language and  
77 support to sections undertaking this work in the coming term.

78 5. Calls upon its Presidium and Secretariat to continue to monitor participation  
79 during statutory meetings through tools such as a Gender Watch, while ensuring  
80 that these tools are inclusive of all gender identities and do not reinforce  
81 binary understandings of gender. In cooperation with Permanent Contact Persons,  
82 this process should also aim to actively encourage and empower participants,  
83 particularly those who may feel less confident or underrepresented, to  
84 contribute to discussions and express their views, thereby fostering a more  
85 inclusive and balanced participation environment.

86 6. Requests the Presidium and Secretariat to extend the scope of diversity  
87 oversight beyond the aforementioned Gender Watch. This should be achieved by  
88 implementing statistical mechanisms to evaluate the diversity of attendees at  
89 statutory events and releasing such data at the beginning of each event.

- 90 **7. Commits to ensuring inclusion and safe participation at all JEF activities as**  
91 **well as to promoting intergenerational dialogue within JEF and UEF.**
- 92 **8. Encourages sections of JEF to adopt and implement their own Codes of Conduct,**  
93 **based on the model set by JEF Europe's own Code of Conduct.**
- 94 **9. Demands JEF Europe and its sections to work on the development of a common**  
95 **framework for Codes of Conduct, completely applying at all levels of the**  
96 **network, with joint minimum standards for the protection of people involved in**  
97 **JEF events, and a mechanism to protect Code of Conduct contact persons in the**  
98 **exercise of their duties.**
- 99 **10. Pledges to ensure respect and safe participation for people belonging to**  
100 **sexual or gender minorities and ensuring that they can freely be themselves,**  
101 **e.g. through providing training on inclusion of people belonging to gender,**  
102 **sexual, racial, national and other minorities.**
- 103 **11. Requires members of the network to show respect for the various gender**  
104 **identities and expressions by encouraging presenting one's preferred pronouns**  
105 **when meeting new people.**
- 106 **12. Affirms that accessibility is a right, not an aspiration, in line with the**  
107 **UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and commits to**  
108 **treating it as a default standard by requiring that JEF events, both in-person**  
109 **and online, be organised with accessibility at their core, including physical**  
110 **accessibility for people with reduced mobility, sign language interpretation or**  
111 **other communication support, captioning and screen-reader-compatible materials**  
112 **for online events, and measures addressing cognitive, psychosocial, and**  
113 **invisible disabilities, not only visible or physical ones.**
- 114 **13. Commits to communicating about accessibility at JEF events in a manner that**  
115 **is clear and reaches all possible participants.**
- 116 **14. Commits to the principle that people from underrepresented groups are**  
117 **meaningfully involved in the design, review, and evaluation of JEF's inclusion**  
118 **and diversity measures, not only as beneficiaries of outreach, and calls on the**  
119 **Task Force on Empowerment and Diversity to ensure that its working methods and**  
120 **membership actively reflect this principle, including by creating dedicated**  
121 **pathways for members with lived experience of marginalisation to contribute to**  
122 **policy development.**
- 123 **15. Supports wide participation from all over Europe, including by making the**

124 **Solidarity Fund more accessible and offering greater possibilities for online**  
125 **participation, by ensuring hybrid participation options for statutory meetings**  
126 **and major events where possible.**

127 **16. Commits to collecting data on the application of the Solidarity Fund and**  
128 **continuously developing it based on the data.**

129 **17. Encourages our members to show and express their views, traditions, culture,**  
130 **religion and beliefs and commits to creating conditions where participants in**  
131 **activities feel safe to do so and respect others' right to do the same.**

132 **18. Supports our members' growth as federalists and active citizens and gives**  
133 **room to all political opinions and affiliations as long as those do not violate**  
134 **anyone else's enjoyment of their rights and JEF Europe values.**

135 **19. Commits to the use of simple and easily understandable language and**  
136 **explanation of difficult terms and abbreviations when using them to guarantee**  
137 **everyone's easy participation in JEF activities and encourages other**  
138 **participants to do so as well.**

139 **20. Commits to use inclusive language in its internal and external communication**  
140 **and take concrete action to communicate its methods on inclusion and building**  
141 **safer spaces.**

142 **21. Commits to actively addressing racial and ethnic discrimination within JEF,**  
143 **recognising that racialised members, including minorities and people with a**  
144 **migration or refugee background, face specific and compounding barriers to**  
145 **participation and leadership, and calls on sections to develop targeted measures**  
146 **to improve the representation and inclusion of these groups, drawing on guidance**  
147 **from the Task Force on Empowerment and Diversity.**

148 **22. Commits to empower capable and knowledgeable members regardless of their**  
149 **gender, background or geographical location who, for whatever reason, might not**  
150 **feel confident enough to run for positions on a local, regional, national and**  
151 **European level, irrespective of whether they have or are currently holding an**  
152 **elected position.**

153 **23. Demands that JEF sections ensure the full participation of people under the**  
154 **age of 18, both at events and internal structures, in a safe way and within what**  
155 **national legislation allows.**

156 **24. Urges JEF Europe Executive Board and the boards of national sections to**  
157 **allocate members of their respective boards, whose task would be to encourage**  
158 **and support individuals with diverse backgrounds in their participation and to**  
159 **run for higher leadership positions within the organisation.**

160 **25. Commits to advertising the elections widely in the network, ensuring that**  
161 **they are organised in a democratic way and in line with federalist values and**  
162 **that the candidates feel empowered and respected.**

163 **26. Recommends JEF sections to develop training programmes aiming at addressing**  
164 **empowerment and diversity of our membership, to complement those offered to**  
165 **sections jointly by Task Force Empowerment and Diversity and Task Force Capacity**  
166 **Building.**

167 **27. Commits to providing opportunities to its Executive Board, Federal Committee**  
168 **and Secretariat to learn about power structures which affect participation in**  
169 **JEF Europe activities from experts and to raise awareness within the network to**  
170 **work for removing these barriers for participation.**

171 **28. Encourages JEF sections to implement practical tools to measure the**  
172 **improvements and share the results and best practices with JEF Europe during**  
173 **statutory and other meetings and i n the internal area for common resources.**

174 **29. Commits to developing and promoting a culture of wellbeing among volunteers**  
175 **and staff, paying particular attention to mental health and right to disconnect,**  
176 **and the disproportionate emotional and organisational labour often borne by**  
177 **members from marginalised groups, and invites the Executive Board to take the**  
178 **lead in developing structures for this in collaboration with the relevant task**  
179 **forces, ensuring that wellbeing measures are designed with the specific needs of**  
180 **underrepresented members in mind.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** EB (decided on: 04/02/2026)

**Title:** Financial guidelines for hosting statutory events

## Motion text

1 Resolution submitted by: JEF Europe Executive Board

### 2 Preamble

3 JEF Europe's statutory events, the Federal Committee (FC) and the European  
4 Congress, are the organisational backbone of the movement. They depend on the  
5 responsible commitment of hosting sections to be delivered at the level of  
6 quality our members expect. These financial guidelines are established to ensure  
7 that hosting sections contribute meaningfully and reliably to the events they  
8 propose to organise, rather than deferring financial responsibility to JEF  
9 Europe at a late stage.

10 These guidelines are adopted by the Federal Committee pursuant to Article 22(v)  
11 of the JEF Statutes (Financial Guidelines) and Article 37 (JEF Policies) and  
12 apply to all national sections applying to host any statutory event of JEF  
13 Europe from the date of adoption. They complement, and do not replace, any  
14 existing Rules of Procedure governing the organisation of statutory meetings.

15 The framework below establishes a three-phase validation pathway with binding  
16 financial milestones, minimum cash and in-kind contribution requirements, and  
17 escalation mechanisms to protect JEF Europe's financial position.

### 18 Part I - Definitions

### 19 Article 1 - Definitions

20 For the purposes of these guidelines:

- 21 • "Hosting Section" means the national JEF section(s) having been selected  
22 to host a statutory event.
  
- 23 • "Candidate Hosting Section" means the national JEF section(s) applying for  
24 the hosting of a statutory event.
  
- 25 • "Statutory Event" means a Federal Committee meeting (FC) or the European  
26 Congress (General Assembly) as defined by Articles 14–25 of the JEF  
27 Statutes. These guidelines concern the organisation of in person statutory  
28 events.
  
- 29 • "Statutory Event Oversight Team": A group composed of the Executive Board  
30 contact person of the host section, JEF Europe's Treasurer, Secretary  
31 General and Membership officer. The composition of this body may be  
32 adjusted where justified by objective circumstances (e.g. sickness, lack  
33 of human resources, important personal reasons etc.), in particular in the  
34 event of the unavailability of one of the two members of the Secretariat.  
35 In such cases, the absent member of the Secretariat shall be replaced by  
36 another member of the Secretariat. Where, for objective reasons, such  
37 participation is not possible and no other members of the Secretariat are  
38 available, additional members of the Executive Board shall be appointed  
39 alongside the Executive Board contact person.
  
- 40 • "Total Event Budget" means the aggregate projected cost of the event,  
41 combining expenses borne by JEF Europe, the Hosting Section, and any  
42 third-party funders.
  
- 43 • "Section Contribution" means the total value of financial (cash) and non-  
44 financial (in-kind) contributions made by the Hosting Section to the  
45 event.
  
- 46 • "In-Kind Contribution" means goods or services provided by the Hosting  
47 Section or sourced by it at no cost to JEF Europe, including, but not  
48 limited to: venue access, volunteer labour, communication materials,

49 catering through local partnerships, accommodation negotiated at below-  
50 market rates, or sponsored side events.

- 51 • "Cash Contribution" means direct monetary payments made by the Hosting  
52 Section to the event budget, either directly or through grants secured on  
53 behalf of the event.
  
- 54 • "Memorandum of Understanding" means the binding bilateral agreement  
55 between JEF Europe and the Hosting Section signed no later than the end of  
56 Phase 1.
  
- 57 • "Solidarity Fund" means the amount of money allocated within the JEF  
58 Europe budget used to cover the travel expenses of a selected number of  
59 delegates to the statutory event who are awarded the solidarity fund  
60 compensation in the guidance provided by the internal resolution "A  
61 solidarity travel fund to support the participation of JEFers to statutory  
62 events".

## 63 Part II - Guiding principles

### 64 Article 2 - Guiding principles

65 The following principles govern the financial relationship between JEF Europe  
66 and a Hosting Section:

- 67 1. **Shared Responsibility:** JEF Europe and the Hosting Section are co-  
68 organisers. Neither party shall be expected to bear the full financial  
69 burden of a statutory event.
  
- 70 2. **Early Commitment:** Financial contributions must be committed and validated  
71 well before the event date. Candidacy plans are binding commitments, not  
72 indicative proposals
  
- 73 3. **Transparency:** All financial information related to the event must be  
74 shared openly and promptly between the Hosting Section and the JEF Europe

75 **Executive Board and Secretariat.**

- 76 4. **Proportionality:** Minimum contribution thresholds are set in proportion to  
77 the type of event. The European Congress requires higher minimum  
78 contributions than a Federal Committee meeting, reflecting the difference  
79 in scale.
- 80 5. **Accountability:** Failure to meet financial milestones triggers escalation  
81 procedures up to and including withdrawal of hosting rights by the Federal  
82 Committee.

83 **Part III - Minimum financial contribution requirements**

84 **Article 3 - Minimum financial contributions by**  
85 **event type**

86 The following minimum section contribution thresholds apply of the overall  
87 budget of the statutory event:

88 **1- Federal Committee Meeting**

- 89 • **Minimum Cash Contribution: 15%**
- 90 • **Minimum In-Kind Contribution (estimated value): 20%**
- 91 • **Minimum Total Section Contribution: 45%**

92 **2- European Congress**

- 93 • **Minimum Cash Contribution: 20%**
- 94 • **Minimum In-Kind Contribution (estimated value): 25%**

- 95
- **Minimum Total Section Contribution: 45%**

96

## **Article 4 - Eligible In-Kind Contributions**

97 **The following categories are eligible for recognition as in-kind contributions,**  
98 **subject to valuation by the JEF Europe Executive Board, and specifically JEF**  
99 **Europe's Treasurer, and Secretariat:**

- 100
- **Venue rental waived or discounted through local partnerships (valued at market rate for comparable venues);**
- 101
- 102
- **Accommodation negotiated below standard market rate (valued at the difference between market rate and the negotiated rate, multiplied by the number of participant-nights);**
- 103
- 104
- 105
- **Catering provided through local sponsors, student associations, or other partnerships at no cost to the event budget;**
- 106
- 107
- **Event communications and branding materials (flags, banners, printed programmes) produced locally at reduced or no cost;**
- 108
- 109
- **Volunteer coordination provided by the Hosting Section (valued at a standard rate of 12€/hour per volunteer, up to 100 hours total);**
- 110
- 111
- **Sponsored side events fully funded by a third party secured by the Hosting Section with transfer of money to the main budget.**
- 112

113 **In-kind contributions not listed above may be recognised at the discretion of**  
114 **the JEF Europe Executive Board and Secretariat, subject to written**  
115 **justification. Only contributions directly reducing the event's net cost to JEF**  
116 **Europe shall be recognised. The in-kind contribution of the host section will be**  
117 **capped at 50% of their total contribution to the event budget. The burden of**  
118 **demonstrating the contribution will be borne by the host section that will use**  
119 **dated quotes as a means of justification.**

120 **Part IV - Three-Phase Validation Pathway**

121 **The hosting process comprises three mandatory phases. Each phase has specific**  
122 **deliverables, financial milestones, and approval gates. Failure to meet the**  
123 **requirements of a phase triggers the escalation mechanisms set out in Part V.**

124 **PHASE 1 | Application, Preparation & Prerequisites**

125 **Article 5 - Timeline and Trigger**

126 **Phase 1 begins when a section submits its candidacy to host a statutory event.**  
127 **Under Article 16 of the JEF Statutes, the European Congress meets at least once**  
128 **per year. Federal Committee meetings take place twice per year, in the spring**  
129 **and the autumn. Phase 1 ends with the vote selecting the Hosting Section, which**  
130 **is ordinarily held approximately a year before the event.**

131 **Article 6 - Candidacy Application Requirements**

132 **A section may only submit a candidacy if the following prerequisites are met at**  
133 **the time of application:**

134 **Prerequisites - All of the following must be satisfied:**

- 135 **1. The section is in good standing with JEF Europe: membership fees are paid**  
136 **in full for the current and preceding year (Article 11(c)(iii) of the**  
137 **Statutes).**
  
- 138 **2. The section has submitted its annual membership statement on time for the**  
139 **preceding year (Article 11(d) of the Statutes).**
  
- 140 **3. The section has not hosted a statutory event in the preceding 24 months,**  
141 **unless no other eligible section has submitted a candidacy.**
  
- 142 **4. The section has designated a named Event Coordinator who will be the**  
143 **primary point of contact for JEF Europe.**

144

## **Article 7 - Mandatory Candidacy Documents**

145 **The candidacy application must include all of the following. Incomplete**  
146 **applications will not be put to a vote.**

- 147       **1. Provisional Event Budget: Full income and expenditure breakdown including:**  
148       **all expense categories (venue, accommodation, catering, travel,**  
149       **materials), projected income sources with realistic amounts,**  
150       **identification of which costs are borne by JEF Europe vs. the Hosting**  
151       **Section. Must distinguish confirmed vs. projected income.**
- 152       **2. Venue Confirmation: Written documentation from the proposed main venue,**  
153       **demonstrating that dates, capacity, and cost have been confirmed.**  
154       **Acceptable forms include a signed letter of intent, a formal booking**  
155       **confirmation, a written quote, or a written confirmation that the venue is**  
156       **provided at no charge or at a reduced rate.**
- 157       **3. Accommodation Plan: Written documentation of accommodation options with**  
158       **per-night costs per participant, covering capacity for at least 90**  
159       **participants (Federal Committee meetings) or 150 participants**  
160       **(Congresses). Acceptable forms include booking confirmations, letters of**  
161       **intent, written quotes, or written confirmation of subsidised or no-cost**  
162       **accommodation. A definitive booking is not required at this stage.**
- 163       **4. Fundraising Plan: Concrete list of grant sources, institutional donors, or**  
164       **sponsors to be approached, with realistic amounts and realistic timelines.**  
165       **Must identify at least one confirmed or highly probable funding source.**
- 166       **5. In-Kind Contribution Inventory: Preliminary list of in-kind contributions**  
167       **the section intends to provide, with estimated values and the means by**  
168       **which they will be secured.**
- 169       **6. Risk Register: Identification of at least three financial risks (e.g.**  
170       **grant rejection, lower participation, cost overruns) and corresponding**  
171       **mitigation measures.**

172       **7. Section Financial Statement: Most recent annual accounts or financial**  
173       **summary of the Hosting Section, confirming the section's financial**  
174       **capacity to underwrite short-term event costs.**

## 175       **Article 8 - Budget Scrutiny and Vote**

176       **The statutory event oversight team shall review all candidacy applications and**  
177       **present a written assessment to the Federal Committee or the European Congress**  
178       **prior to the vote. The assessment shall include:**

- 179       • **Evaluation of the feasibility and credibility of the proposed budget;**
  
- 180       • **Identification of any gaps between projected income and projected**  
181       **expenditure;**

## 182       **Article 9 - Memorandum of Understanding**

183       **Within 30 days of the vote confirming the Hosting Section, JEF Europe and the**  
184       **Hosting Section shall sign a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding. The**  
185       **Memorandum of Understanding shall set out:**

- 186       • **The agreed minimum cash contribution of the Hosting Section;**
  
- 187       • **The agreed minimum in-kind contribution and the method of valuation;**
  
- 188       • **The Phase 2 financial milestone (see Article 11);**
  
- 189       • **The Phase 3 financial milestone (see Article 14);**
  
- 190       • **The escalation procedure in the event of non-compliance (see Article 18);**
  
- 191       • **The reporting schedule and the identity of the Event Coordinator.**

192 **The Memorandum of Understanding is binding on both parties. It may be amended by**  
193 **mutual written agreement of JEF Europe and the Hosting Section.**

194 **PHASE 2 | Post-Selection Fundraising & seven-month Milestone**

## 195 **Article 10 - Overview of Phase 2**

196 **Phase 2 covers the period from the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding to**  
197 **six months prior to the event date. During this phase, the primary**  
198 **responsibility of the Hosting Section is to activate its fundraising plan,**  
199 **confirm income sources, and demonstrate that the event budget is on track. At**  
200 **this stage the Statutory event oversight team and the hosting section**  
201 **representatives have monthly meetings to update on the progress of the**  
202 **fundraising plan.**

## 203 **Article 11 - Seven-Month Milestone**

204 **No later than seven months before the event date, the Hosting Section must**  
205 **demonstrate that the following milestone has been reached:**

206 **Phase 2 - Seven-Month Milestone Requirements:**

- 207 **• At least 50% of the Hosting Section's total agreed Section Contribution is**  
208 **confirmed (either received, or covered by a signed grant decision or**  
209 **formal commitment letter from a funder);**
  
- 210 **• Venue availability is confirmed in writing, either through a signed**  
211 **contract, a conditional booking, or a letter of intent pending final**  
212 **financial confirmation;**
  
- 213 **• Accommodation covering at least 80% of expected participants is confirmed**  
214 **to be available with suppliers, or documented through signed letters of**  
215 **intent or written quotes with held availability;**
  
- 216 **• A revised budget is submitted to JEF Europe, updated to reflect confirmed**  
217 **income and any cost changes;**

218 • A written report on the status of all fundraising activities, including  
219 applications submitted, decisions received, and applications pending.

220 • The section should have a specific attention for the cashflow and its  
221 consequences for the organisation of the event.

## 222 **Article 12 - Quarterly Reporting During Phase 2**

223 During Phase 2, the Hosting Section shall submit a brief financial status report  
224 to the JEF Europe Treasurer every three months, covering:

225 • Income confirmed to date (with evidence);

226 • Expenditure committed or incurred to date;

227 • Outstanding fundraising applications and expected decisions;

228 • Any changes to the event programme or costs.

229 **PHASE 3 | In-Depth Preparation, Production & Additional Contributions**

## 230 **Article 13 - Overview of Phase 3**

231 Phase 3 covers the six months immediately preceding the event. This is the  
232 period of intensive operational preparation. The focus shifts from fundraising  
233 to event production, additional in-kind mobilisation, and closing any remaining  
234 budget gaps. JEF Europe assumes a greater coordinating role during this phase,  
235 while the Hosting Section intensifies its local operational effort. At this  
236 stage the Statutory event oversight team and the hosting section representatives  
237 have bi-monthly meetings to update on the progress of the operations.

## 238 **Article 14 - Three-Month Milestone**

239 **No later than three months before the event date, the Hosting Section must**  
240 **demonstrate that the following milestone has been reached:**

241 **Phase 3 - Three-Month Milestone Requirements:**

- 242 • **100% of the Hosting Section's agreed cash contribution is confirmed**  
243 **(received or covered by signed commitment);**
  
- 244 • **At least 75% of the total estimated in-kind contribution is confirmed,**  
245 **with written evidence for each item;**
  
- 246 • **The volunteer team is confirmed (minimum 5 local volunteers for an FC;**  
247 **minimum 10 for a Congress).**

## 248 **Article 15 - Additional In-Kind Contributions** 249 **and Sponsored Side Events**

250 **During Phase 3, Hosting Sections are expected to make a final effort to increase**  
251 **the event's non-JEF Europe income by securing additional in-kind contributions**  
252 **or sponsored side events. Examples of eligible additional contributions include:**

- 253 • **Printed delegate materials (badges, programmes, tote bags) provided by a**  
254 **local sponsor;**
  
- 255 • **Local transport coordination or shuttle services provided at no cost;**
  
- 256 • **Professional photography or videography services provided pro bono;**
  
- 257 • **Additional catering sponsored by local businesses (breakfasts, coffee**  
258 **breaks, receptions).**

259 **The Hosting Section shall notify the JEF Europe Treasurer of all additional**  
260 **contributions as they are secured. These contributions shall be added to the in-**

261 kind register and may be used to offset any shortfall against the minimum in-  
262 kind contribution threshold.

## 263 **Article 16 - Event Production Responsibilities**

264 **During Phase 3, the Hosting Section is responsible for the following operational**  
265 **deliverables, in coordination with JEF Europe Secretariat:**

- 266 • **Local venue management: liaison with venue staff, setup of rooms for**  
267 **plenary and working group sessions, technical equipment (microphones,**  
268 **projectors, Wi-Fi);**
  
- 269 • **Accommodation management: check-in coordination, resolution of booking**  
270 **issues, communication of logistics to participants;**
  
- 271 • **Catering coordination: delivery of meals and coffee breaks as per the**  
272 **agreed plan; communication of dietary requirements to caterers;**
  
- 273 • **Local transport and accessibility: provision of clear transport**  
274 **information to participants; assistance with special accessibility needs;**
  
- 275 • **Volunteer coordination: briefing, scheduling, and supervision of local**  
276 **volunteers;**
  
- 277 • **Communications support: local social media coverage, photography, and**  
278 **post-event content in coordination with JEF Europe Comms team.**

## 279 **Article 17 - Final Financial Settlement**

280 **Within 45 days after the event, the Hosting Section shall submit a final**  
281 **financial report to the JEF Europe Treasurer including:**

- 282 • **All actual income received, broken down by source;**

- 283 • All actual expenditure incurred, with receipts;
- 284 • Final reconciliation of all in-kind contributions with evidence of  
285 delivery;
- 286 • Transfer of any surplus held by the Hosting Section to JEF Europe, or  
287 documentation of any final payments owed by JEF Europe.
- 288 • In the case of a deficit of contribution, a plan for settlement will be  
289 drawn up between JEF Europe and the hosting section to reach the expected  
290 contribution. Unless otherwise agreed under article 20.

291 JEF Europe will issue a final settlement statement within 45 days of receiving  
292 the complete report. Any amount owed by either party shall be settled within 60  
293 days of the statement, unless agreed otherwise bilaterally.

## 294 Part V - Escalation and Enforcement

### 295 Article 18 - Escalation Triggers

296 The following situations trigger escalation procedures:

#### 297 1. Level 1

298 (a) Situation: Failure to submit the Phase 2 seven-month milestone report on  
299 time, or the report reveals less than 30% of the Section Contribution confirmed.

300 (b) Consequence: JEF Europe Executive Board issues a formal written warning. The  
301 hosting section has 14 days to provide a remediation plan. Failure to submit the  
302 remediation plan within 14 days automatically triggers Level 2.

#### 303 2. Level 2

304 (a ) Situation: At the six-month mark, the statutory event oversight team's

305 **viability assessment concludes that the event cannot proceed as planned; or the**  
306 **venue has not been confirmed in any form; or less than 50% of the Section**  
307 **Contribution is confirmed with no credible recovery path.**

308 **(b) Consequence: The Executive Board must, no later than six months before the**  
309 **event, convene an exceptional Federal Committee meeting or add the matter to the**  
310 **agenda of the next scheduled Federal Committee meeting, at which the Federal**  
311 **Committee shall vote on whether to relocate the event to an alternative host or**  
312 **move it to an online format.**

### 313 **3. Level 3**

314 **(a ) Situation: Phase 3 three-month milestone not met, or less than 75% of the**  
315 **cash contribution confirmed at the three-month mark.**

316 **(b) Consequence: The Executive Board convenes an emergency review. The Board may**  
317 **vote to provide an emergency bridge contribution from JEF Europe reserves or**  
318 **require the hosting section to secure additional funding within a defined**  
319 **deadline.**

### 320 **4. Level 4**

321 **(a ) Situation: Six weeks before the event, the event budget shows a deficit**  
322 **exceeding 15% of the total event budget with no credible mitigation plan.**

323 **(b) Consequence: The Executive Board convenes a final emergency review. The Board**  
324 **may vote to scale down the event programme or, as a last resort, draw on JEF**  
325 **Europe's reserves.**

## 326 **Part VI - Safeguards**

### 327 **Article 19 - Statutory event without a hosting** 328 **section**

329 **1. In the case of a lack of candidacy for the hosting of statutory events JEF**  
330 **Europe can organise a statutory event in an online format.**

331

## **Article 20 - Exceptional bilateral agreement**

332

1. In the case of a candidating section not being able to fulfill all the requirements, a bilateral agreement can be found between JEF Europe represented by the EB and the candidating section to bypass one of the rules set out in the present document.

333

334

335

336

2. The foreseen needed exception will have to be notified to JEF Europe as soon as possible in the process and ideally already signaled during the application process in front of the FC (Phase 1).

337

338



# Motion

**Proposer:** Cyprien Bettini and Konstantin Petry (JEF Europe DEFC members)

**Title:** Distancing ourselves from Far-right and Radical-right organisations and individuals (FROIs).

## Motion text

1 Submitted by Cyprien BETTINI, Konstantin PETRY, Directly-Elected FC Members for  
2 the Spring FC 2026 in Belgrade.

### 3 Preamble

4 JEF Europe,

5 having regard to the Ventotene Manifesto and the Hertenstein declaration, having  
6 regard to the Statutes of JEF Europe,

7 having regard to the Code of Conduct of JEF Europe,

8 **whereas:**

9 **A. whereas the Federalist movement historically emerged during the Second World**  
10 **War in opposition to Nazism and fascism;**

11 **B. whereas contemporary far-right political parties, in some cases, continue to**  
12 **reproduce elements of fascist ideology, rhetoric and symbolism;**

13 **C. whereas political institutions, notably the European Parliament, have**  
14 **developed the practice of the cordon sanitaire, consisting of refusing**

15 cooperation, contact or alliances with far-right parties and groups within  
16 parliamentary institutions;

17 D. whereas far-right parties have sought to circumvent this practice through  
18 strategies of 'normalisation' (also referred to as 'de-demonisation'), aimed at  
19 occupying public debate and moderating their rhetoric to appear acceptable to  
20 the general public, the media and institutions;

21 E. whereas such strategies, while effective in institutional terms, do not alter  
22 the fundamentally exclusionary and harmful ideological core of these movements;  
23 F. whereas far-right thinkers and ideologues have increasingly sought to  
24 appropriate the European project, including Dominique Venner and Alain de  
25 Benoist, and whereas these ideas have been taken up by far-right and radical-  
26 right political parties as part of their European-level normalisation  
27 strategies;

28 G. whereas this development has already had concrete consequences within the  
29 European Parliament, where the EPP has formed coalitions with P/E, ESN and ECR  
30 to adopt some amended proposals in spite of the mainstream coalition partners  
31 (S&D, Renew, the Greens).

32 H. whereas additional organisations, currently marginal, have been established  
33 to promote ideas associated with Dominique Venner without explicitly  
34 acknowledging their ideological origins;

35 I. whereas one such organisation was the former JEF Lithuania interest group  
36 that referenced to federalism with euro-nationalist concepts, notably the notion  
37 of a so called 'layered identity' (region-nation-Europe) defining belonging to a  
38 'European civilisation', and reflecting an essentialist vision of Europe based  
39 on ethnic differentiation rather than civic equality;

40 J. whereas other similar organisations may seek in-person and online contact  
41 with JEF Europe, its sections and its partners, under the guise of purportedly  
42 federalist and/or pro-european advocacy;

43 K. whereas JEF Europe and its sections must not confer public legitimacy or  
44 institutional access upon organisations whose values are incompatible with those  
45 of the movement;

46 L. whereas JEF Europe, as a non-party organisation, applies the principle of  
47 transpartisanship in order to engage with all political actors supporting deeper  
48 European integration, while excluding cooperation with actors whose values are

49 incompatible with its own;

50 JEF Europe therefore:

51 **Article 1: Definitions and scope**

52 **1. Defines, for the purposes of this resolution, operational criteria for the**  
53 **following political currents:**

54 ● **Nationalism: The willingness of a social group to form a common political**  
55 **community. Originally an idea from the French revolution, that is focused on the**  
56 **equality between citizens, it nowadays often implies the superiority of said**  
57 **nation upon the others.**

58 ● **Far right: Political movements that want to focus politics around a set, and**  
59 **therefore, unpluralistic, identity.**

60 ● **Antisemitic, racist, and other inegalitarian movements that build themselves**  
61 **around the belief that one group of people is unequal to other groups**

62 ● **Authoritarian, and therefore undemocratic groups, may they be left or right 2.**  
63 **Decides for the purpose of the present Resolution to call the above-mentioned**  
64 **organisations as Far-right and Radical-right organisations and individuals**  
65 **(FROIs). 3. Decides to cease and refrain from all relations with organisations**  
66 **that: (a) promote ideas manifestly associated with FROIs; or**

67 **(b) adopt attitudes or ideologies manifestly incompatible with the Code of**  
68 **Conduct of JEF Europe.**

69 **4. Decides that the identification, monitoring and classification of FROIs shall**  
70 **be coordinated by the Federal Committee, as precised in Article 4 of the present**  
71 **Resolution.**

72 **Article 2: Political activities and campaigns of JEF Europe**

73 **4. Decides that JEF Europe, its Secretariat and the members of its governing**  
74 **bodies shall not participate in any activity involving one or more**  
75 **organisations.**

76 **5. Considers that such activities include, inter alia:**

- 77 (a) demonstrations and political events;
- 78 (b) conferences, debates, round tables or other forms of exchange;
- 79 (c) meetings with elected representatives, institutional partners or civil  
80 society organisations;
- 81 (d) internal and external communication activities;
- 82 (e) any other activity liable to affect the public image of JEF Europe, its  
83 sections or its members.

84 6. Decides that all forthcoming campaigns shall prioritise the fight against the  
85 far right and that the participation of the JEF in collaborative campaigns shall  
86 be conditional upon compliance with this requirement.

87 **Article 3: Political activities and campaigns of the sections**

88 6. Encourages the sections of JEF Europe to apply the principles set out in this  
89 resolution at national and local level;

90 7. Strongly advises sections not to invite or interact with:

91 (a) representatives of FROIs, their local chapters or affiliated entities;

92 (b) individuals or organisations not identified as FROIs but whose ideology is  
93 manifestly incompatible with the political platform or Code of Conduct of JEF  
94 Europe. 8. Calls on sections to raise awareness among their members of the  
95 importance of this resolution through training activities, structured  
96 discussions or dedicated events; 9. Strongly encourages sections, in accordance  
97 with their own Codes of Conduct and internal procedures, to engage in structured  
98 dialogue with any member who has established links with an organisation listed  
99 in Annex I.

100 **Article 4: Implementation and enforcement**

101 10. Sets-up a Task-Force dedicated to the correct implementation of the present  
102 Resolution, which shall:

103 a. Define which organisations and individuals are associated with FROIs; b.

104 **Monitor FROIs activities;**

105 **c. Develop political and advocacy tools to address FROIs;**

106 **d. Alert any relevant JEF bodies when a member or a section are approached by**  
107 **and/or shared FROIs content;**

108 **e. Conduct any activities, within the limit of the JEF statutes, to ensure the**  
109 **correct enforcement of the present Resolution.**

110 **11. Entrusts the Executive Board to:**

111 **a. Distance themselves from any FROIs identified by the Federal committee; b.**  
112 **Enforce, in a joint effort with the FC, the present resolution;**

113 **c. Inform sections upon the decisions taken in the framework of the present**  
114 **resolution;**

115 **d. Inform a section whose member(s) might have been approached by and/or shared**  
116 **FROIs content;**

117 **12. Deems the Arbitration board relevant to solve any inter-personal and/or**  
118 **statutory issue related to the present resolution.**



# Motion

**Proposer:** EB (decided on: 04/03/2026)

**Title:** On the management of the multilingual JEF web magazine

## Motion text

1 JEF Europe | Young European Federalists Federal Committee, Belgrade, April 19th,  
2 2026

3 JEF Europe,

4 ● Affirming its commitment to disseminate federalist perspectives on European  
5 and international affairs;

6 ● Highlighting the need for a European-wide public sphere as a key building  
7 block of a well functioning European-level democracy;

8 ● Honouring the long history of JEF's magazine, from paper editions of The New  
9 Federalist published from the 1970s, to the web magazine launched by JEF France  
10 in 2005; ● Proud of the achievements of the JEF web magazines, today available  
11 in seven languages and providing an additional multilingual space for articles  
12 in other languages [1];

13 ● Recognising the work of national and local JEF sections which run their own  
14 magazines outside the multilingual JEF web magazine platform, both online and in  
15 print;

16 ● Acknowledging that magazines published by JEF offer a platform for aspiring  
17 journalists, and enable JEF volunteers to enhance their journalistic skills and  
18 level of reflection on European affairs;

- 19 ● Recognising the academic value of the web magazine, as evidenced by citations  
20 of the magazine's articles in academic papers and research work on EU affairs;
- 21 ● Convinced that the JEF web magazine is one of the leading and most well-  
22 established youth led platforms for commentary and journalism on EU affairs;
- 23 ● Committed to ensuring a prominent role for the JEF web magazine in the  
24 organisation's work and external communications;
- 25 ● Recognising the need for a clear organisational framework and allocation of  
26 responsibilities between JEF Europe and the national sections regarding the  
27 management of the web magazine;
- 28 ● Noting that the management of a language edition of the web magazine involves  
29 tasks such as ensuring that the edition has one or more active Editors, assuming  
30 legal responsibility for the contents published by the edition, and offering  
31 capacity-building support for the edition;
- 32 ● Recognising that JEF Europe has particularly exercised leadership in managing  
33 the English edition of the web magazine, whereas other language editions might  
34 have different kinds of relations with their JEF section of reference;
- 35 ● Committed to preserving the editorial independence of all editions of the web  
36 magazine;
- 37 ● Convinced of the benefits of close cooperation between the language editions  
38 of the web magazine, taking forms such as mutual translation of articles,  
39 sharing of resources, and joint editorial initiatives; English (The New  
40 Federalist), French (Le Taurillon), German (Treffpunkt Europa), Italian  
41 (EuroBull), Finnish/Swedish ( (Tähdistö), Romanian (România Europeană).

42 JEF Europe therefore,

43 1. Assumes the responsibility for providing organisational and management  
44 support for the English language edition of the web magazine;

45 2. Recognises that every language edition has an editorial board which holds  
46 responsibility for the functioning of the edition, and that this board might be  
47 linked, with different rules or practices, to a national or local JEF section of  
48 reference. Where needed, JEF-Europe may exchange with these sections on issues  
49 related to the editions;

- 50 **3. Encourages the participation of national and candidate JEF sections in**  
51 **countries where the language of an existing language edition is widely spoken in**  
52 **the management of the language editions, subject to an agreement between the**  
53 **sections concerned;**
- 54 **4. Recognises that the JEF Europe President should act as the responsible party**  
55 **regarding the English language edition of the web magazine and for the**  
56 **multilingual space, thereby holding legal responsibility for the publications;**
- 57 **5. Tasks each language edition to define and publicly communicate its policy for**  
58 **the assignment of legal responsibility for the contents published in the**  
59 **editions, where appropriate with the support of the national sections supporting**  
60 **the editions and in line with the jurisdiction applying to the language edition;**  
61
- 62 **6. Requests that at the beginning of every even year, a meeting of all the**  
63 **representatives of the language editions will review the status of the**  
64 **publishing software and will appoint responsible people for the technical**  
65 **management and, if needed, an upgrade of the publishing software, the costs of**  
66 **which will be shared by the language editions impacted;**
- 67 **7. Agrees that a section or group responsible for the management of a language**  
68 **edition may, after giving reasonable advance notice, delegate the responsibility**  
69 **to JEF Europe;**
- 70 **8. Acknowledges that JEF-France currently holds the technical management of the**  
71 **web platform and that for the sake of technical clarity, this should remain so**  
72 **until a common work on a new web platform is launched;**
- 73 **9. Resolves that the decisions on the appointment and dismissal of the**  
74 **Editor(s)-in-Chief of the English language edition should be made by the JEF**  
75 **Europe Executive Board, acting in consultation with the Editor(s)-in-Chief of**  
76 **the English language edition and, where appropriate, the JEF Europe Secretariat;**  
77
- 78 **10. Specifies that the selection of the Editor(s)-in-Chief of the English**  
79 **language edition should follow an open and transparent application process;**
- 80 **11. Tasks the Editor(s)-in-Chief of the English language edition with recruiting**  
81 **and leading an editorial board for the language edition;**

- 82 **12. Acknowledges that the Editor(s)-in-Chief of the English language edition**  
83 **possess editorial independence and responsibility regarding the management of**  
84 **the day-to-day affairs of the edition;**
- 85 **13. Commits to appoint a point of contact from within the Executive Board of JEF**  
86 **Europe which will be responsible for communication and coordination between JEF**  
87 **Europe and the English language edition;**
- 88 **14. Advises the sections or groups responsible for a language edition to define**  
89 **the procedures for appointing and dismissing the Editor(s)-in-Chief and the**  
90 **editorial boards of their respective language editions, in cases where such a**  
91 **procedure is not already in place;**
- 92 **15. Requests the sections responsible for a language edition to inform JEF**  
93 **Europe and the Editors-in-Chief of other language editions of the contact**  
94 **details of the edition's Editor(s)-in-Chief;**
- 95 **16. Calls for Editors-in-Chief of the language editions to maintain consistent**  
96 **lines of communication, and to organise periodical meetings to discuss the**  
97 **cooperation between the language editions, facilitated by JEF Europe where**  
98 **appropriate;**
- 99 **17. Resolves that decisions on the creation of a new language edition should be**  
100 **made by the national or candidate section of the country/countries where the**  
101 **language is widely spoken, jointly with JEF Europe;**
- 102 **18. Resolves that the decisions should be made in light of criteria for the**  
103 **establishment of a language edition to be defined by the Editors-in-Chief of**  
104 **existing language editions, and that Editors-in-Chief of the existing language**  
105 **editions should be consulted on the decisions;**
- 106 **19. Resolves that in the absence of a national or candidate section, JEF Europe**  
107 **may in duly justified circumstances decide to create a language edition,**  
108 **following the process set out above;**
- 109 **20. Decides that where a language edition has fallen inactive, the Editors-in-**  
110 **Chief of other language editions may jointly make recommendations to the section**  
111 **responsible for the edition and to JEF Europe regarding the course of action to**  
112 **be taken;**
- 113 **21. Decides that where the section responsible for the edition is unable to**

114 carry out the tasks related to the management of the language edition, JEF  
115 Europe may take on the tasks, while keeping the section informed;

116 22. Commits to continuing its work to identify and offer capacity-building  
117 opportunities, including project funding, designed to promote the development of  
118 the web magazine;

119 23. Notes that the language editions of the web magazine have the possibility to  
120 share announcements via JEF Europe's internal and external communication  
121 channels, including JEF newsletters and social media communications;

122 24. Encourages JEF sections to promote the opportunity to read and contribute to  
123 the web magazine, and to foster connections between the editorial team members  
124 of the language editions, the wider JEF membership, and young people at large;

125 25. Commits to involve the language editions, as appropriate, where JEF Europe  
126 becomes aware of an editorial collaboration opportunity with a partner.